G.R. No. A.M. No. MTJ-06-1655 ; March 6, 2007
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, Complainant, vs. HON. GINA M. BIBAT-PALAMOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, BRANCH 47, Respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Leonardo R. Ocampo filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos for gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty. The complaint stemmed from the alleged delay in issuing a writ of execution in an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 754-95) where a final and executory decision in Ocampo’s favor had been rendered by the Supreme Court. Ocampo filed a motion for execution on September 27, 2005. The respondent judge resolved and granted the motion only on January 11, 2006, and the order was received by Ocampo on February 11, 2006. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent judge be censured, finding that the delay constituted gross ignorance of the law, as ejectment decisions are immediately executory to prevent further damage to the prevailing party.
In her defense, the respondent judge filed a second motion for reconsideration. She argued that there was no undue delay, as she had set the motion for hearing and gave the defendant time to file a comment until October 20, 2005. She contended that the 83-day period from the lapse of the comment period to her resolution on January 11, 2006, was within the three-month constitutional period for lower courts to decide matters. She further explained that the subsequent mailing delay was due to a court-ordered physical inventory of cases.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty for the alleged delay in resolving the motion for execution of a final ejectment judgment.

RULING

No, the respondent judge is not administratively liable. The Supreme Court granted the second motion for reconsideration, set aside the penalty of censure, and dismissed the complaint. The Court held that the respondent judge’s actions did not constitute gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, or neglect of duty. The legal logic is anchored on the absence of bad faith, malice, or corrupt motives. While ejectment decisions are immediately executory, the respondent judge’s procedural steps—setting the motion for hearing and allowing the defendant a period to comment—were exercises of judicial discretion to afford due process and explore potential compromise, principles encouraged by the Court. The period taken to resolve the motion from its deemed submission (after the comment period lapsed) fell within the constitutional three-month reglementary period for lower courts. The subsequent mailing delay was reasonably explained by a mandatory court inventory. Gross ignorance of the law requires not merely an error in judgment but a conscious, malicious, or corrupt disregard of basic rules. Here, the respondent acted in good faith and with a desire to ensure orderly proceedings. The Court also noted her unblemished record and the policy of allowing second motions for reconsideration in administrative cases when justified.