AM MTJ 05 1587; (April, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. MTJ-05-1587. April 15, 2005
Pilar Barredo-Fuentes, et al., Complainants, vs. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin, MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, Respondent.
FACTS
Complainants, defendants in three consolidated forcible entry cases, were adjudged liable by respondent judge. After losing on appeal, they filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending this annulment case, the plaintiffs in the ejectment cases filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion” before respondent judge, seeking an order to direct the sheriff to enforce a previously issued writ of demolition. Complainants allege this motion was granted without being set for hearing and without them being served a copy, in violation of procedural rules.
Respondent judge denies any impropriety. He explains that the demolition writ had already been validly issued after hearings, and the ex-parte motion merely sought its enforcement. He argues no injunctive relief from the RTC restrained him from acting, and the motion was incidental to execution. He further contends the complaint is a dilatory tactic, noting the ejectment judgments had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether respondent judge is administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and/or Grave Abuse of Discretion for granting the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion.
RULING
No, the administrative charges are dismissed. For a judge to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the act must not merely be erroneous but must be committed with bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. The Court found no such malice here. The respondent judge’s explanation is legally tenable: the core relief (the demolition order) had already been granted after due hearing. The subsequent ex-parte motion was essentially a plea for the sheriff to perform a ministerial duty to enforce a final and executory judgment. The pendency of a separate annulment case does not automatically suspend execution, absent a restraining order. While the better practice may have been to require notice, the judge’s action, under these specific circumstances, did not rise to the level of gross ignorance warranting administrative sanction. The Court emphasized that judges should not be subject to administrative complaints for every perceived error, especially when such acts are within their judicial discretion and not tainted with fraud or dishonesty.