A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518; January 15, 2004
Attys. Vilma Hilda D. Villanueva-Fabella and Wilmar T. Arugay, complainants, vs. Judge Ralph S. Lee and Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr., both of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 38, Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS

Complainants, counsels for defendants in a sum of money case, charged Judge Ralph S. Lee with gross ignorance of the law and Sheriff Justiniano de la Cruz Jr. with oppressive enforcement of a writ of attachment. The sheriff levied on a printing machine despite defendants’ immediate offer to pay the exact attachment amount. He also delivered the property to the plaintiff’s warehouse instead of keeping it in official custody. Subsequently, Judge Lee granted the defendants’ motion to discharge the attachment upon filing a counterbond. However, he later granted the plaintiff’s ex-parte motion to withdraw this cash deposit without notice to the defendants, effectively releasing the funds before the main case was resolved.
Judge Lee rectified this error only after the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. Further, complainants alleged irregularity when the judge, via a handwritten note, swiftly granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of a non-suit order, while the defendants’ own pending motion remained unresolved for over two months.

ISSUE

Whether respondents Judge Lee and Sheriff de la Cruz Jr. are administratively liable for their actions in relation to the writ of attachment and the handling of the cash counterbond.

RULING

Yes, both respondents are administratively liable. The Supreme Court found Sheriff de la Cruz Jr. guilty of simple misconduct. His failure to take and safely keep the attached property in his custody, as expressly required by Rule 57, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, constituted a clear disregard of established rules. His actions demonstrated a lack of diligence and prudence in the performance of his official duty.
Judge Lee was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. His order releasing the cash counterbond to the plaintiff was a blatant violation of Rule 57, Section 12, which mandates that such a deposit “shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching plaintiff may recover.” By allowing its withdrawal upon an ex-parte motion, he effectively deprived the defendants of the security for a potential judgment in their favor, a fundamental error that undermined the very purpose of a counterbond. While he later corrected the mistake, his initial order exhibited a profound lack of understanding of basic procedural rules. The Court emphasized that judges must embody competence and diligence, and failure to apply elementary legal principles constitutes gross ignorance.