AM 997; (September, 1979) (Digest)
A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979
PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Pilar Abaigar sought the disbarment of respondent attorney David D.C. Paz. She alleged that in March 1970, she contacted the office of Congressman Bagatsing for legal assistance regarding a foreign divorce case. Paz, who answered, volunteered his services. After the case, Paz professed love and proposed marriage, allegedly misrepresenting that his existing civil marriage was not a church-sanctioned union and thus no impediment to marrying her. Abaigar claimed she accepted, they applied for a marriage license, and Paz convinced her to cohabit as husband and wife, resulting in a pregnancy that was later lost. In April 1971, she discovered Paz was also church-married to his wife, Virginia Paz. She accused Paz of deceit and grossly immoral conduct for taking advantage of her confidence.
In his answer, Paz denied all allegations of an illicit relationship and marriage proposal. He asserted his interactions were purely professional, involving legal assistance such as drafting letters and helping with family legal matters. He admitted lending her money and providing referrals but maintained he never misled her about his marital status or engaged in any improper conduct. He characterized the complaint as an act of revenge.
ISSUE
Whether the evidence presented by the complainant is sufficient to warrant the disbarment or disciplinary action against respondent attorney for deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the administrative complaint. The legal logic centered on the stringent standard of proof required in disbarment proceedings. The Court emphasized that the power to disbar is exercised with great caution due to its severe consequences. The burden of proof rests squarely on the complainant, who must establish the charges by clear, convincing, and preponderant evidence. The record must demonstrate a corrupt act free from doubt to compel disciplinary action.
Applying this standard, the Court found the complainant’s evidence insufficient. The Solicitor General’s investigation, to which the Court gave weight, concluded that the evidence failed to convincingly prove deceit or grossly immoral conduct. The report indicated the relationship, if it occurred, was a voluntary act between consenting adults, not a product of professional deception by the respondent in his capacity as a lawyer. There was no convincing proof that Paz exploited his attorney-client relationship to facilitate immoral acts or defraud the complainant. The complaint appeared motivated by personal grievances rather than a genuine professional ethical breach. Consequently, the Court ruled that the requisite compelling proof to justify the extreme penalty of disbarment was not met.
