G.R. No. A.M. No. 595-CFI December 11, 1978
QUINTIN STA. MARIA, complainant, vs. HON. ALBERTO UBAY, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Quintin Sta. Maria, as attorney-in-fact for a defendant in Civil Case C-2052, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Alberto Ubay. The charges included violating the constitutional mandate to decide cases within three months from submission, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and falsification by antedating a decision to conceal the delay. The case was submitted for decision on April 17, 1973. Judge Ubay signed the decision on July 14, 1973, and filed it with the Branch Clerk of Court on the same date but with instructions to withhold its promulgation. The decision was ultimately promulgated on August 8, 1973, which the complainant argued was 113 days after submission, exceeding the three-month period.
The respondent judge, in his comment, contended the case should be considered decided on July 14, 1973, the date he signed and filed the decision with the clerk of court, notwithstanding the withheld promulgation. He asserted compliance with the constitutional deadline, as July 14 was within the 90-day period from April 17. The issue centered on whether the date of signing and filing, or the later date of promulgation, constituted the “decision” for compliance with the constitutional period.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Ubay violated the constitutional requirement to decide a case within three months by signing and filing a decision but ordering its promulgation to be withheld, resulting in its release after the statutory period.

RULING

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay. The constitutional period for deciding cases is mandatory. The Court ruled that a case is deemed decided only upon the promulgation of the judgment, which is when the decision is filed with the clerk of court without conditions and the parties are notified. Here, the judge’s act of filing the signed decision on July 14, 1973, but instructing the clerk to withhold promulgation, rendered the decision merely tentative and subject to change. The unconditional filing necessary for finality only occurred when the order to promulgate was given on August 8, 1973, which was beyond the three-month period. The legal logic is that a decision becomes binding and final only upon its release from the judge’s control and service to the parties, not upon a signing date if its release is deliberately suspended. Therefore, the delay constituted a failure to decide promptly. However, considering the delay was not prolonged and it was an isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished record, and as the judge had reached compulsory retirement age, the Court imposed a penalty commensurate with these circumstances by ordering the forfeiture of a portion of his retirement benefits. The charges of rendering an unjust judgment and falsification were dismissed for lack of merit.