AM 392; (July 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 392 July 31, 1975
LUISA DE NACIONAL, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Luisa de Nacional charged respondent Judge Segundo M. Zosa with miscarriage of justice in two criminal cases. In Criminal Case No. 395, accused Antonio Cortes was charged with Frustrated Murder against complainant’s husband. Respondent Judge imposed an indeterminate sentence of six months and one day, crediting the accused with three mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender, drunkenness, and plea of guilty. Complainant alleged these circumstances were improperly considered. She argued surrender was not voluntary as the accused was arrested, drunkenness was habitual, and the plea of guilty should not mitigate as the accused had escaped custody. Respondent Judge, in his comment, defended his judgment, stating the fiscal did not object to these circumstances, though he acknowledged considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance.
The Supreme Court referred the matter for investigation. The focal complaint centered on Criminal Case No. 395. The investigation revealed the respondent Judge credited the mitigating circumstances without conducting a proper hearing. For voluntary surrender, he merely questioned a policeman in open court without oath. For drunkenness, he relied solely on a fiscal’s manifestation that the accused “smelled liquor” upon arrest, without verifying if it was habitual or intentional. Regarding the plea of guilty, the accused changed his plea after several prosecution witnesses had testified.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law or procedure warranting administrative liability by crediting mitigating circumstances without proof and by considering a plea of guilty entered after presentation of prosecution evidence as mitigating.
RULING
The Court dismissed the administrative charge but admonished the respondent Judge. The legal logic is anchored on distinguishing between errors of judgment and gross ignorance. The Judge erred in considering voluntary surrender and drunkenness as mitigating circumstances without requiring evidentiary proof. Established doctrine mandates that mitigating and aggravating circumstances must be proven before they influence penalty imposition. The Judge’s reliance on the fiscal’s lack of objection was untenable; the duty to ascertain facts through a hearing rests on the court.
Furthermore, crediting the plea of guilty as mitigating after prosecution witnesses had testified was a clear legal error, contravening jurisprudence (People v. Manibpel). However, this mistake, like the others, constituted an error of judgment, not gross ignorance borne of bad faith. The Court emphasized that judges cannot be held administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling, as this would make their position untenable. The absence of bad faith was evident, as the Judge’s lapses stemmed from over-reliance on the fiscal’s concessions. Nevertheless, the Judge was admonished for failing to follow basic procedural requirements to establish factual bases for sentencing, with a warning that repetition would be severely dealt with.
