A.M. No. 386-MJ. August 26, 1977.
Eusebio N. Muñoz, complainant, vs. Judge Alejandro T. Viojan, Municipal Judge, Sto. Nino, Western Samar, respondent.

FACTS

The respondent, Municipal Judge Alejandro T. Viojan, was the subject of an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority, misconduct, malicious delay in the administration of justice, and violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on crimes against public interest. The complaint stemmed from his handling of two criminal cases for qualified theft. In Criminal Case No. 1602, filed on April 18, 1973, the judge conducted a preliminary examination, dismissed the charges against one accused for lack of probable cause, but found probable cause against the other and issued a warrant of arrest. In Criminal Case No. 1606, filed on May 8, 1973, he similarly found probable cause against the accused and issued warrants.
On May 10, 1973, Judge Viojan issued an order inhibiting himself from hearing both criminal cases, citing grounds under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. This order was endorsed to and approved by the District Judge, who then designated another municipal judge to take over the cases. The designated judge assumed jurisdiction and subsequently dismissed both cases upon motions by the Provincial Fiscal in June 1973.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Alejandro T. Viojan is administratively liable for grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and malicious delay in the administration of justice for inhibiting himself from the criminal cases.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative charges for lack of merit. The Court found no evidence to support the allegations of malicious intent or dereliction of duty. The act of inhibition itself is a judicial prerogative provided for by the Rules of Court, and Judge Viojan properly followed the procedure by having his order of inhibition approved by the supervising District Judge. The subsequent designation of another judge was done promptly, and the assigned judge acted with dispatch in handling the cases, ultimately dismissing them based on the fiscal’s motions.
The legal logic is clear: an order of inhibition, when done in accordance with the rules and without evidence of corrupt or malicious intent to obstruct justice, does not constitute an administrative offense. The complainant failed to substantiate the claim that the inhibition was a scheme to cause delay. On the contrary, the swift approval of the inhibition and the immediate reassignment of the cases demonstrated the proper functioning of judicial machinery without undue prejudice to the parties. The Court concluded the complaint was likely filed to harass the respondent judge, as it was pursued even after the cases had been lawfully transferred and acted upon by another competent court.