G.R. No. A.M. No. R-284-P. November 11, 1993.
GVM, INC. AS SEC-APPOINTED RECEIVER FOR FUIFC AND FNCC CAPITAL CORPORATION, complainant, vs. ARMANDO DE GUZMAN, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF RIZAL DETAILED AT MAKATI, METRO MANILA, respondent.
FACTS
The complainant, GVM, Inc., as SEC-appointed receiver for two financially distressed corporations, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Deputy Sheriff Armando M. de Guzman. The complaint stemmed from the respondent’s enforcement of a writ of possession issued by Branch 143 of the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 7701, a petition to quiet title filed by AEA Development Corporation over the FNCC Building. The regular deputy sheriff, Jose A. Ascaño, served the writ and a “Notice to Vacate” on September 6, 1984, giving the complainant fifteen (15) days, or until September 21, 1984, to voluntarily vacate the premises. On September 20, 1984, one day before the deadline, respondent, who had been hastily appointed as a special sheriff that same day, implemented the writ. The enforcement was described by the complainant as abusive, reckless, oppressive, and barbaric, carried out in the late afternoon/evening of September 20 and continuing into September 21 (a public holiday), thereby preventing the complainant from seeking judicial remedies. The complainant alleged that this harsh implementation resulted in the loss and damage of vital financial documents and evidence crucial for its receivership duties and for a separate case against AEA. The respondent claimed his actions were proper, that a compromise was reached for a staggered vacation of the premises, and that the removal of properties was assisted by the complainant’s men.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Deputy Sheriff Armando M. de Guzman is administratively liable for the manner in which he enforced the writ of possession.
RULING
Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. The Supreme Court found that the respondent prematurely enforced the writ of possession. The Notice to Vacate served by the regular sheriff explicitly granted the complainant until September 21, 1984, to vacate. By implementing the writ on the afternoon of September 20, 1984, the respondent acted two days before the authorized deadline. The Court held that this unauthorized and premature implementation, characterized by its timing to preclude judicial recourse and its harsh and oppressive execution—which led to the loss of critical documents—constituted oppression, gross misconduct, and discourtesy. The Court rejected the investigating judge’s recommended penalty of a six-month-and-one-day suspension as too light. Instead, considering the gravity of the respondent’s actions, which were grossly prejudicial to the service, the Court imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any government or government-controlled corporation.