AM 2170 Mc P 1356; (November, 1979) (Digest)
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.
FACTS
Judge Remigio E. Zari recommended the dismissal of Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores on three grounds: his 1967 conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; his persistent attempts to unduly influence the judge regarding pending cases through handwritten notes, even after being relieved from his post at Branch VI; and his gross discourtesy via a letter using strong and contemptuous language against city judges. In his answer, Flores argued his libel conviction did not involve moral turpitude, noted his appointment was approved despite it, and denied attempting undue influence. He counter-charged that Judge Zari had tried to corrupt him by instructing him on how to decide specific cases and by involving him in an improper lunch meeting with litigants.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Diosdado S. Flores should be dismissed from the service based on the grounds of conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and dishonesty.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of Diosdado S. Flores. The legal logic proceeds from the foundational principle that public office is a public trust, demanding the highest standards of integrity and morality from court personnel. First, the Court found that libel is indeed a crime involving moral turpitude, as it constitutes an offense against social order and indicates a depravity of character. This conviction alone constituted a valid ground for disciplinary action. Second, Flores’s conduct in attempting to influence cases, even after his transfer, demonstrated a clear lack of the propriety and impartiality required of a court officer, amounting to conduct prejudicial to the service.
Third, and decisively, the Court found Flores guilty of dishonesty. In his 1969 affidavit submitted for his appointment, he falsely declared he had no criminal record, deliberately concealing his libel conviction. This act of falsification directly undermined the integrity of the judicial appointment process and betrayed a character unfit for public service. The Court emphasized that such dishonesty, coupled with his prior conviction and improper conduct, rendered him wholly unworthy of remaining in the judiciary. The penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from re-employment in government was imposed to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.