A.M. No. 212-J November 22, 1974
Maria Esporlas Vda. de Recario, Florentino Gadaza, and Rosita Mitra, complainants, vs. Hon. Benjamin H. Aquino, respondent.

FACTS

The complainants filed an administrative complaint against then District Judge Benjamin Aquino of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch VIII, who had resigned from the judiciary on September 30, 1972. They alleged that his failure to act promptly on a petition for prohibition (CFI Case No. 13335) they filed caused them damage. That prohibition case sought to enjoin the Municipal Judge of Muntinlupa, Rizal, from further hearing and rendering judgment in an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 228) where the complainants were defendants. They averred that the judge’s inaction allowed the ejectment case to proceed, leading to a decision against them and the subsequent demolition of their properties.
In his answer, respondent Judge admitted the filing of the prohibition case on June 4, 1970, and that it was set for hearing on the merits on July 22, 1970. He explained that the respondents in the prohibition case moved for its dismissal because the Municipal Court had already decided the ejectment case, rendering the petition moot. Furthermore, he noted that the complainants never applied for a writ of preliminary injunction or a restraining order to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the prohibition case. The ejectment case was eventually appealed to the CFI.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino is administratively liable for the alleged damages suffered by the complainants due to the demolition of their properties.

RULING

The Court dismissed the complaint. The legal logic centers on the absence of fault or undue delay attributable to the respondent judge and the mootness of the administrative proceeding. The records show that the prohibition case was set for hearing within a reasonable period—48 days after its filing. The critical fact is that the complainants did not seek ancillary relief in the form of a preliminary injunction or a restraining order when they filed their petition for prohibition. Such a writ was the proper legal mechanism to immediately halt the proceedings in the inferior court and preserve the status quo. Any prejudice suffered by the complainants was, therefore, a consequence of their own procedural omission, not due to any error, delay, or bad faith on the part of Judge Aquino. The Court found no indication of malicious intent or neglect in his handling of the case.
Moreover, the administrative case had been rendered moot and academic. Respondent Judge had already resigned from the service on September 30, 1972. The primary purpose of an administrative complaint against a judge is to preserve judicial integrity, and if warranted, to impose penalties ranging from reprimand to dismissal. Since the respondent was no longer in the judiciary, any further investigation would be futile, as the ultimate sanction of separation from service could no longer be applied. Consequently, the complaint was dismissed and the case considered closed.