AM 2113; (April, 1981) (Digest)
A.M. No. 2113-MJ. April 22, 1981. NICOMEDES PENERA, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE CRESCENCIO R. DALOCANOG OF GENERAL LUNA PILAR, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Atty. Nicomedes Penera charged respondent Judge Crescencio R. Dalocanog with ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and corrupt practices. The charges stemmed from the judge’s dismissal of a forcible entry complaint (Civil Case No. 17) filed by Penera, which the judge ruled had prescribed and involved a boundary dispute beyond his jurisdiction. Penera contended the action was timely and no boundary issue was pleaded. He highlighted an undue delay, as the complaint was filed in November 1975 but dismissed only in September 1978 without a trial on the merits.
Additional allegations included that the judge notarized a deed of sale where four vendors did not personally appear before him, and that he routinely collected notarial fees based on a percentage of the transaction value. The respondent judge denied the charges, arguing the forcible entry case was on appeal, making the issue moot, and claimed the deed was properly signed in his office, while denying the systematic charging of fees.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge Dalocanog is administratively liable for the alleged acts.
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge is administratively liable, though not for all charges. The Supreme Court found the specific allegation of ignorance of the law regarding the dismissal of the forcible entry case had become moot and academic since the matter was elevated on appeal, rendering it sub judice and improper for administrative adjudication. However, the Court emphasized that the judge’s prolonged inaction on the case for nearly three years was inexcusable. Notably, a motion to dismiss filed in May 1978 was resolved only in September 1978, a delay of about four months. This constituted a clear violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 ( Republic Act No. 296 ), which mandates judges to decide motions within ninety (90) days from submission. Such undue delay congests dockets and undermines the speedy administration of justice.
Furthermore, the Court found the respondent judge acted beyond his authority by notarizing a deed of sale, as a notary public ex-oficio should only notarize documents connected with the exercise of his official judicial duties. This act was unrelated to such duties. Consequently, the respondent judge was found guilty of violating Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and for exceeding his authority as a notary public ex-oficio. He was reprimanded and admonished that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.