G.R. No. A.M. No. 188. November 29, 1976.
RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, complainant, vs. ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.

FACTS

The Supreme Court, in a 1973 decision, found respondent Atty. Esteban T. Bumanglag guilty of gross immoral conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for two years. His subsequent motions for reconsideration were all denied, rendering the decision final and executory. In 1975, the Court received a communication from the Office of the President enclosing a petition from the respondent. In this petition, respondent asked the President to promulgate a decree setting aside the Court’s suspension order and to allow him to practice law in the “New Society.”
The Court, in a June 1975 resolution, required respondent to show cause why he should not face further disciplinary action for making false statements about being deprived of due process and, more critically, for gross ignorance of the law in asking the President to override a final judicial decision. Respondent promptly withdrew his petition in a letter to the President, acknowledging his “big mistake” and recognizing that his action did not observe the protocol of separation of powers. In his explanation to the Court, he apologized, conceded the Chief Executive’s lack of authority to alter a Supreme Court decision, and assured no repetition.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Atty. Esteban T. Bumanglag should be subjected to additional disciplinary action for his petition to the President seeking executive reversal of a final and executory Supreme Court disciplinary order.

RULING

Yes, but the penalty is mitigated to a reprimand. The Court found respondent’s act of soliciting presidential intervention to set aside a final judicial decision to constitute gross ignorance of a fundamental constitutional principle. The ruling is grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers, a cornerstone of both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which prohibits one branch of government from encroaching upon the core functions of another. The judiciary’s power to disbar or suspend lawyers is exclusive and final; the Executive branch has no authority to annul or modify such a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, is presumed to know this basic constitutional law. Respondent’s action demonstrated a serious deficiency in this essential knowledge, warranting disciplinary sanction.
However, the Court exercised liberality in mitigation. It considered respondent’s prompt withdrawal of the petition, his written apology, his expressed realization of the constitutional violation, and his completion of the original two-year suspension. These factors indicated remorse and a belated understanding, leading the Court to impose only a reprimand with a stern warning against future transgressions. The Court also addressed respondent’s ancillary complaint about resolutions being transmitted by the Clerk of Court, clarifying this as a standard and authorized administrative practice necessary for judicial efficiency.