A.M. No. 1867 December 19, 1980
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), complainant, vs. ROMEO A. REAL, respondent.

FACTS

The National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-MIF) filed a verified complaint seeking the disbarment of respondent lawyer Romeo A. Real. The union alleged that Real committed violations of his oath, malpractice, disregard of the law and lawful orders, and ignorance of the law. These charges stemmed from his actions during the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement between his client, Red V Coconut Products, Ltd., and the Tanglaw ng Paggawa union, which was affiliated with the complainant. The complainant essentially accused Real of obstructing its demands against the company.
In his comment, Real, a lawyer admitted in 1940, countered that the complaint was a direct offshoot of the ongoing labor dispute between the union and his client. He asserted that the complaint was filed because the union believed he was blocking their demands. He pointed out various inaccuracies and misrepresentations within the complaint. Subsequently, the complainant filed a motion to cite Real for contempt, alleging he used intemperate and offensive language in his comment. Real defended his language as a provoked response to the untruthful charges against him.

ISSUE

Whether the administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Romeo A. Real should be dismissed following the complainant’s formal withdrawal of the charges.

RULING

Yes, the complaint is dismissed. The Supreme Court, through Justice Aquino, ordered the dismissal and closure of the case. The legal logic for dismissal is grounded in procedural finality and the nature of administrative proceedings when the complainant loses interest in prosecution. The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. However, the investigation could not proceed because the complainant’s counsel repeatedly failed to appear at the scheduled hearings. This failure to prosecute already indicated a lack of earnestness in pursuing the charges.
The decisive factor was the complainant’s subsequent filing of a formal withdrawal of both the disbarment complaint and its contempt motion. The union explicitly stated the case arose from a “simple misunderstanding,” that the parties had settled their differences, and that the complaint should be considered withdrawn and dismissed. The Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, correctly observed that given this voluntary and explicit desistance, there was no alternative but to recommend dismissal. The Court concurred, as continuing a disbarment proceeding absent a complaining witness and upon a settled misunderstanding would be untenable. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the Court’s inherent power to initiate disbarment proceedings sua sponte if evidence of professional misconduct arises independently in the future, but no such grounds were apparent from the withdrawn complaint.