AM 1840; (June, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 1840-MJ June 11, 1981
VICTORIANO FAJOTA, complainant, vs. HON. CESAR BALONSO, Acting Municipal Judge of Palauig, Zambales, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Victoriano Fajota charged respondent Municipal Judge Cesar Balonso with gross ignorance of the law. The complaint stemmed from a libel case filed against Fajota based on a letter he wrote in his official capacity. Respondent Judge accepted the complaint, ordered Fajota’s arrest, and detained him for over ten hours until he posted a real estate bond. Respondent proceeded with the arraignment and then remanded the records to the Court of First Instance.
In his defense, respondent Judge denied personal involvement in the bail process and claimed Fajota waived the second stage of preliminary investigation. He argued that his actions were based on a prior Supreme Court ruling (Mercader vs. Valila) which upheld the jurisdiction of justices of the peace over libel preliminary investigations. He admitted he overlooked the subsequent amendment by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4363.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of a libel case in violation of R.A. No. 4363.
RULING
Yes, respondent Judge is administratively liable. The Court found his explanation for overlooking R.A. No. 4363 unacceptable. This law, which amended Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, clearly provides that a complaint for libel may be filed only in the Court of First Instance. The authority to conduct a preliminary investigation for libel is vested exclusively in the city court or the municipal court of the provincial capital. Respondent, as Municipal Judge of Palauig—which is neither a city nor a provincial capital—acted without jurisdiction when he accepted the libel complaint and ordered the arrest.
The Court emphasized that the provisions of R.A. No. 4363 are “so clear and unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even interpretation,” as held in Quizon vs. Baltazar. Furthermore, the Department of Justice had circularized all judges about this amendment as early as 1967. Respondent’s reliance on an outdated ruling and failure to keep abreast of a clear statutory change demonstrated a deplorable lack of the diligence required of a judge. His error was not a simple mistake but an act of gross ignorance of a plain and categorical law. Accordingly, the Court suspended respondent from office for six months without pay.