G.R. No. A.M. No. 1594 May 7, 1976
ESTRELLA OCHIDA, complainant, vs. HONESTO CABARROGUIS, respondent.

FACTS

Estrella Ochida was the defendant in a civil case before the Court of First Instance of Davao. During a hearing on September 24, 1975, Atty. Honesto Cabarroguis, counsel for the opposing heirs, argued a motion and characterized Ochida as a “fugitive from justice,” citing five pending warrants of arrest against her. Opposing counsel immediately objected, deeming the statement irrelevant, and the court ordered it stricken from the records. Ochida, deeply resenting the characterization as a calumny, filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Cabarroguis on October 8, 1975.
In his comment, respondent Cabarroguis invoked absolute privilege for relevant statements made in judicial proceedings. He argued his remark was pertinent to highlight Ochida’s alleged dilatory tactics, noting she faced estafa charges. He further pointed out that a Provincial Fiscal had dismissed Ochida’s criminal complaint for grave oral defamation based on the same utterance, and a related civil case for damages had also been dismissed by the trial court. Ochida, in her reply, contended the imputation was irrelevant and inaccurate, as she had posted bail bonds, and she had appealed the dismissal of her civil case.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Honesto Cabarroguis committed gross misconduct justifying disciplinary action for his statement branding complainant Estrella Ochida a “fugitive from justice” during a court hearing.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the disbarment complaint but issued a warning to the respondent. The ruling balanced the duty of professional decorum against the latitude afforded to lawyers in advocacy. The Court acknowledged that a lawyer must treat opposing parties with fairness and avoid offensive personalities under the Canons of Professional Ethics. The term “fugitive from justice” was deemed intemperate and abrasive, as it technically refers to one who flees to avoid punishment, and a more decorous lawyer would have avoided such language.
However, the legal logic centered on the context and privilege of judicial proceedings. The Court found it believable that the respondent, frustrated by opposing counsel’s repeated alibis regarding Ochida’s absence, was provoked into using strong language. Crucially, the Court reiterated the doctrine that lawyers are allowed some latitude of remark in the furtherance of their client’s causes and may be “pardoned some infelicities of phrase.” The respondent’s utterance, while improper, did not rise to the level of gross misconduct warranting disciplinary sanction, especially considering the subsequent dismissals of related criminal and civil complaints. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly warned the respondent that the use of such offensive language should be avoided and that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.