A.M. No. 1399, June 29, 1978
Visitacion Egos, complainant, vs. Herminia G. Gallardo, respondent.

FACTS

The case originated from an ejectment decision against complainant Visitacion Egos by the City Court of Cavite. Egos appealed and posted a supersedeas bond, but the court deemed it insufficient and ordered execution. Egos sought relief through petitions for certiorari and injunction with the Court of First Instance and subsequently the Court of Appeals. During this process, the City Court issued a writ of execution on December 15, 1975, directing the sheriff to make a return within thirty days. The writ was received on December 16, 1975.
While Egos’s petition was pending, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order on January 15, 1976. This order was later vacated on July 21, 1976, with an entry of judgment on August 9, 1976. Relying on this development, respondent Herminia G. Gallardo, the Acting City Sheriff, enforced the original writ and ejected Egos from the property on August 24, 1976.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Sheriff Herminia G. Gallardo acted without authority and with incompetence in enforcing a writ of execution whose mandated return period had already expired.

RULING

Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. The Supreme Court found that the writ of execution, issued on December 15, 1975, had a specific lifespan of thirty days from its receipt on December 16, 1975. This period expired on January 16, 1976. When respondent enforced the same writ on August 24, 1976, she acted upon a stale and functus officio writ, devoid of any legal authority. Her duty was to know the basic rule that a writ of execution must be implemented within the period fixed by the court; its force expires thereafter.
The Court rejected her defense that she acted based on a letter from the plaintiff’s counsel following the lifting of the appellate court’s restraining order. The legal logic is clear: a restraining order from a higher court merely suspends the enforcement of a writ but does not extend its original validity period. Once the order is lifted, the writ is not automatically revived if its mandated period has lapsed. The proper procedure was for the respondent to inform the issuing court of the situation, allowing the interested party to seek a new alias writ of execution. Her failure to do so constituted a lack of diligence and carefulness in the performance of her official duties. Considering the absence of bad faith, her clean record, and the fact that the lapse was not brought to her attention, the Court imposed a penalty of severe reprimand with a warning for future infractions.