AM 1371; (December, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 1371 December 29, 1978
JOSE A. ARFAPO, complainant, vs. ATTY. TEODORO V. NANO, SR., respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Jose A. Arfapo charged respondent Atty. Teodoro V. Nano, Sr. with malpractice. The allegations were that Atty. Nano prepared a deed of absolute sale for a portion of land without the knowledge and participation of the vendor-spouses Arfapo, and that he deliberately altered the agreed consideration from P6,000.00 to P5,500.00. It was claimed that the P500.00 difference, allegedly intended for payment of realty taxes in arrears, was appropriated by the respondent. The respondent, in his answer, vehemently denied the charges. He asserted that the parties had voluntarily come to his office, that the price was mutually agreed upon at P5,500.00, and that taxes were not part of the discussion. He countered that the complaint was a retaliatory act prompted by civil and criminal cases he had filed against Arfapo.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. Subsequently, the parties reached an amicable settlement of their related civil case. Complainant Arfapo executed an “Affidavit to Dismiss the Case,” stating he had lost interest in prosecuting the administrative complaint and formally requested its dismissal. During the hearing before the investigating fiscal, Arfapo reiterated his desistance on the witness stand.
ISSUE
Whether the administrative charges for malpractice against Atty. Teodoro V. Nano, Sr. are substantiated by sufficient evidence to warrant disciplinary action.
RULING
The Court dismissed the administrative charges. The ruling is anchored on the fundamental principle that the burden of proof in disbarment proceedings rests squarely upon the complainant, and the case must be established by convincing evidence. In this instance, the complainant failed to discharge this burden. Instead of presenting evidence to prove his affirmative allegations, he submitted an affidavit of desistance, settled his differences with the respondent, and actively sought the dismissal of the case.
While the desistance of a complainant does not automatically divest the Court of its authority to investigate and discipline members of the bar, it significantly impedes the fact-finding process. Here, the withdrawal of the complaint, coupled with the absence of any corroborating evidence, left the charges unsubstantiated. The respondent lawyer is entitled to the presumption that, as an officer of the Court, he performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Furthermore, the Court noted that the deed of sale in question appeared regular on its face and bore no visible traces of the alleged alteration. Consequently, with no convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and in light of the complainant’s desistance, the Court found the recommendation of the Solicitor General for dismissal to be meritorious.
