AM 12 8 07 CA So; (July, 2016) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, July 26, 2016
Case Parties: Former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan (Movant) vs. The Court (addressing a Motion for Reconsideration)
FACTS
1. On June 16, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution (penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion) which, among other things, DENIED the request of former CA Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan to have her prior services as a National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Commissioner included in the computation of her longevity pay as a member of the judiciary.
2. Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, adopting the arguments from dissenting opinions (by Justices Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco, Jr.) to the June 16, 2015 Resolution. She argued that the determination of “efficient and meritorious service” for longevity pay should not be solely determined by the judiciary and cited her illustrious career in the Executive branch and the judiciary.
3. The ponencia (majority opinion) granted Justice Gacutan’s Motion for Reconsideration. Justice Brion dissented from this grant.
ISSUE
Whether the prior government service of a member of the judiciary in an executive position (specifically as an NLRC Commissioner) may be included in the computation of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
RULING
(DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE BRION):
Justice Brion voted to DENY with finality Justice Gacutan’s Motion for Reconsideration. The core ruling of the dissent is that prior executive service cannot be credited for judicial longevity pay. The reasons are:
1. The Grant of Longevity Pay is Confined to Judicial Service: Section 42 of BP 129 is clear and unambiguous. It grants longevity pay only to justices and judges for “each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary.” Longevity pay is a separate benefit, not part of the basic salary under Section 41. The proviso limiting total salary to that of the next rank is merely a cap to prevent disruption of the compensation hierarchy, not an integration of longevity pay into the basic salary schedule.
2. No Legal Basis for Including Executive Service: There is no express law that includes past service in another government branch in the computation of judicial longevity pay. Republic Act No. 9347, which amended the Labor Code to grant NLRC Commissioners the same rank, salary, and benefits as CA Associate Justices, merely uses the judicial compensation as a “yardstick.” It grants NLRC commissioners the same salary grade and corresponding salary/allowances. It does not, expressly or impliedly, amend Section 42 of BP 129 to allow tacking NLRC service onto judicial service for longevity pay computation. Granting such a benefit to executive officials is an act exclusively within the constitutional prerogative of Congress.
3. Separation of Powers Principle: The grant of an equivalent judicial rank to an executive official does not make that official a member of the judiciary. Therefore, benefits that accrue exclusively to judiciary members, like longevity pay for judicial service, cannot be granted for executive service. To do so would violate the separation of powers.
4. Prohibition Against Judicial Legislation: To grant longevity pay for past NLRC service based on the judicial longevity pay provision would be an act of judicial legislation. The law (Section 42, BP 129) is clear in its requirement of service “in the judiciary.” The Court has no authority to expand this clear requirement.
