G.R. No.: A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC, A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC. July 26, 2016.
Case Parties:

* Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan.
Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her Services as MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be Considered as Part of Her Judicial Service and Included in the Computation/Adjustment of Her Longevity Pay.

FACTS

This is a consolidated resolution concerning requests for the inclusion of prior government service in the computation of longevity pay for members of the judiciary. The Court reconsidered its prior Resolution dated June 16, 2015, which had denied the request of Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Angelita A. Gacutan to include her services as a Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in computing her longevity pay. Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that granting her request would be a recognition of justice and equity for a lifelong public servant, and would not constitute judicial legislation.

ISSUE

Whether the prior service of a member of the judiciary in an executive position (specifically, as an NLRC Commissioner) can be included in the computation of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

RULING

YES, but only from the date the law granting parity in salary took effect for that specific executive position. The Court granted Justice Gacutan’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court held that longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is treated as part of “salary.” Certain laws, such as Republic Act No. 9347 (amending the Labor Code), expressly grant officials in the Executive Department (like NLRC Commissioners) the same rank, qualifications, salaries, privileges, and benefits as their counterparts in the Judiciary. The legislative intent is to place these executive officials “at par” with their judicial counterparts to correct inequities and deter migration from the executive to the judiciary.
Since “salary” includes basic monthly pay plus longevity pay, and the law grants executive officials the same “salary” as judges/justices, the grant of longevity pay is logically included. This interpretation is supported by the Court’s long-standing jurisprudence and the executive branch’s contemporaneous construction.
However, this entitlement is not retroactive to the start of the executive service, but only from the effectivity of the law establishing the salary parity. For Justice Gacutan, her service as NLRC Commissioner can be credited for longevity pay computation only from August 26, 2006, when R.A. No. 9347 took effect. Consequently, she became entitled to longevity pay five years later, on August 26, 2011. The Court emphasized that this ruling is not judicial legislation but an application of existing laws (R.A. Nos. 9417, 9347, 10071) and jurisprudence.