AM 1022; (May, 1976) (Digest)
A.M. No. 1022-MJ. May 7, 1976. REDENTOR ALBANO, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PATROCINIO C. GAPUSAN of Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Redentor Albano charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio C. Gapusan with incompetence and ignorance of the law. The first charge stemmed from an act respondent performed in 1941, five years before his judicial appointment, wherein he notarized a document providing for the personal separation of spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. The agreement contained stipulations, including a clause to refrain from filing adultery or concubinage actions, which are contrary to law and public policy. Respondent denied drafting the agreement, explaining it was executed after a long de facto separation to prevent violent incidents and included a provision for possible reconciliation.
The second charge alleged that Judge Gapusan improperly influenced Judge Zacarias A. Crispin of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in deciding two related criminal cases. Albano implied that due to Gapusan’s friendship with Judge Crispin and familial ties to a party in the cases, one case resulted in an acquittal and another in Albano’s conviction. Respondent admitted a professional association with Judge Crispin through judges’ leagues and acknowledged a distant relative was involved but vehemently denied exerting any influence over the judicial outcomes.
ISSUE
The issues are: (1) Whether respondent is administratively liable for notarizing a void separation agreement years before his judgeship; and (2) Whether respondent is liable for allegedly influencing another judge’s decisions in criminal cases.
RULING
On the first charge, the Court found respondent liable as a member of the bar, but not as a judge. The notarized agreement was void for being contrary to law, morals, and public policy. The Civil Code explicitly voids contracts for personal separation and extrajudicial agreements dissolving the conjugal partnership during marriage, as they undermine the inviolable social institutions of marriage and the family. A notary public must not facilitate such disintegration. The Court has consistently censured notaries for such acts. However, since the act was committed in 1941, long before respondent’s 1946 appointment to the judiciary, and his judicial appointment was screened by the Commission on Appointments, it does not warrant disciplinary action against him in his capacity as a municipal judge. He is censured solely in his capacity as a lawyer.
On the second charge, the Court dismissed it for lack of substantive evidence. The allegation of influence was based merely on suspicion, conjecture, and the fact of friendship between the judges. The Court emphasized that fraternization between judges is not unethical per se. An unjust verdict due to influence must be substantiated by solid, indubitable evidence, not inference. The charge was speculative and unfair to Judge Crispin, who had since retired. A complaint based on such unsubstantiated suspicion cannot be sustained.