G.R. No. 104 ; January 28, 1954
BENITA S. BALINON, petitioner, vs. CELESTINO M. DE LEON, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The Solicitor General filed a complaint against respondents Celestino M. de Leon and Justo T. Velayo, both members of the bar. The complaint alleged that since December 1948, respondent de Leon, while still legally married to Vertudes Marquez, lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon. On February 4, 1948, respondent de Leon prepared and subscribed an affidavit before respondent Velayo, a notary public. The affidavit declared, among other things, that a contract of separation existed between de Leon and his wife, granting each the liberty to take a new lifetime partner, and that by virtue of said contract, de Leon was taking Regina S. Balinon as his “true and lawful wife.” It contained promises of loyalty, fidelity, and provisions regarding property and offspring. The complaint alleged the affidavit served an unlawful and immoral purpose and that respondent Velayo knowingly notarized it in violation of his oath. Respondent de Leon admitted to the cohabitation and preparing the affidavit but contended he had not been finally convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, that the affidavit was a mere unilateral declaration, and that no specific law was violated. Respondent Velayo alleged his participation was limited to notarizing the affidavit as a courtesy without knowing its contents, a claim corroborated by de Leon.

ISSUE

Whether the respondents, as members of the bar, should be disciplined for their involvement in the preparation and notarization of the affidavit which facilitated an illicit cohabitation.

RULING

The Court suspended respondent Celestino M. de Leon from the practice of law for three years and reprimanded respondent Justo T. Velayo. The Court held that the affidavit prepared by de Leon, a lawyer, virtually permitted himself to commit concubinage by making it appear he could take another woman as a lifetime partner and lawful wife during his subsisting marriage. This constituted a grossly immoral act. The Court rejected de Leon’s defense that his acts were unrelated to his professional duties, stating that he employed his knowledge and skill as a lawyer to prepare the affidavit for his own advantage, thereby rendering professional service to himself as a client. As for respondent Velayo, while his duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the affiant’s identity and the declaration’s voluntariness, he was negligent in affixing his signature to an illegal or immoral document, though his fault was mitigated by his reliance on the good faith of his co-respondent.