G.R. No. A.C. No. 973 January 21, 1974
RICARDO P. VELEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. AGUSTIN T. LOCSIN, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Ricaredo P. Velez filed two disbarment complaints against respondent Atty. Agustin T. Locsin, both predicated on alleged moral turpitude. The first complaint, filed in 1970, alleged that a Pontiac sedan was imported tax-free under Republic Act No. 1916 in the name of the religious organization Barangay Sang Virgen, purportedly as a donation. Complainant asserted that respondent, who arranged and paid for the importation, was the car’s true beneficial owner and used it daily for his personal and professional purposes, thereby fraudulently evading taxes. Respondent answered that the car was validly assigned to him by the Barangay for use in his duties as its Chief Legal Counsel and as a lawyer for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bacolod. The Supreme Court dismissed this first complaint on March 9, 1971, without prejudice to filing charges with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In 1973, complainant filed a second complaint, reiterating the prior allegations and adding new circumstances. He alleged that when the car was later impounded, respondent secured its release and paid overdue taxes and duties in his own name under Presidential Decree No. 52, a tax amnesty measure. Subsequently, the Barangay executed a deed of conveyance selling the car to respondent. Complainant argued these acts confirmed that the original importation was a scheme to avoid taxes, with respondent as the real importer and owner from the outset.

ISSUE

Whether the acts of respondent Atty. Agustin T. Locsin constitute moral turpitude warranting disbarment.

RULING

The Court dismissed the second administrative complaint. The legal logic centers on the insufficiency of the evidence to prove moral turpitude, defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards. The Court found no conclusive proof that the car’s original importation was a fraudulent scheme to circumvent Republic Act No. 1916 , which grants tax exemptions for donations to religious organizations. The authorization for respondent to use the car in performing his duties as counsel for the Barangay did not, by itself, prove the importation was for his personal benefit rather than for the organization’s use. The subsequent payment of taxes under Presidential Decree No. 52 and the eventual sale of the car to respondent were not inherently indicative of initial bad faith. The sale could plausibly be explained by respondent’s assumption of an obligation related to the car and his prior use of it. The Court emphasized that the propriety of availing of the tax amnesty decree was a matter more appropriately raised in a tax proceeding, not in a disbarment case based on moral turpitude. Absent clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent intent from the inception, the administrative charge for conduct involving moral turpitude could not be sustained.