GR 42270; (July, 1977) (Digest)
March 14, 2026GR L 18388; (June, 1963) (Digest)
March 14, 2026A.C. No. 9464. August 24, 2016
Intradent Zahntechnik, Phils., Inc., represented by Luis Marco I. Avanceña, complainant, vs. Atty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo, respondent.
FACTS
The complainant, Intradent Zahntechnik, Phils., Inc., informed the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) of several criminal cases it had filed against the respondent, Atty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo. These cases, for estafa, qualified theft, and violation of the Revised Penal Code, were alleged to involve moral turpitude. The notification occurred shortly after the respondent passed the 2011 Bar Examinations. The OBC allowed her to sign the Roll of Attorneys in May 2012, but with the condition that the complainant’s letter would be automatically converted into a disbarment complaint.
In her comment, the respondent claimed the criminal charges were fabricated to harass her in retaliation for a labor case she had filed against the complainant for illegal dismissal. She subsequently manifested that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had dismissed the estafa and qualified theft complaint. The complainant countered that it had appealed this dismissal to the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2015, the respondent moved for the resolution of the disbarment case, reporting that the DOJ had denied the complainant’s appeal and that the remaining criminal information filed in Quezon City had been dismissed upon the prosecution’s own motion for withdrawal.
ISSUE
May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper based on the criminal charges filed against her?
RULING
No, the disbarment complaint cannot prosper. The Court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the case. The legal logic is anchored on the specific requirements for disbarment under the Rules of Court. While the initial complaint sought to prevent the respondent’s admission to the Bar—a process governed by Section 2, Rule 138, which allows inquiry into pending charges involving moral turpitude—the converted case is one for disbarment.
Section 27, Rule 138 enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension. For a lawyer to be disbarred on the ground of moral turpitude, the rule expressly requires that the lawyer must have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude by final judgment. The mere filing or pendency of criminal charges, regardless of their serious nature, is insufficient to warrant disbarment. In this case, the complainant failed to allege, much less prove, any such final conviction. On the contrary, the criminal cases that formed the sole basis of the complaint had been definitively dismissed by the competent prosecutorial offices and trial court. The Court emphasized that the dismissal of these cases, even if subject to appeal at one point, removed the foundational basis for the administrative complaint. Consequently, without a final judgment of conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, the disbarment action must fail.

