A.C. No. 898. February 24, 1971.
JOSEFINA M. ORTEGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Josefina M. Ortega sought the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto F. Rivera. She alleged that he had carnal knowledge of her under a promise of marriage, which resulted in her pregnancy, and subsequently refused to fulfill his promise to marry her. In his answer, the respondent lawyer categorically denied all allegations, including any courtship, promise of marriage, intimacy, or responsibility for the complainant’s pregnancy.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Multiple scheduled hearings for the investigation were repeatedly cancelled upon the motion or request of the complainant’s counsel, citing the complainant’s inability to appear due to various reasons, including indisposition. Ultimately, at a hearing on February 8, 1971, the complainant’s counsel presented an affidavit executed by Josefina Ortega dated January 28, 1971. In this affidavit, she stated she was voluntarily and freely withdrawing her disbarment complaint against Atty. Rivera, attributing it to a “misunderstanding.”

ISSUE

Whether the Court should dismiss the disbarment case against Atty. Ernesto F. Rivera in light of the complainant’s affidavit of desistance.

RULING

Yes, the case is dismissed. The Court adopted the recommendation of the Solicitor General for dismissal and the exoneration of the respondent. The legal logic proceeds from the nature of disbarment proceedings. While the Court explicitly acknowledged that malpractice or unprofessional conduct of a lawyer is a matter of public interest, and that a complainant’s desistance does not automatically preclude further action by the Court, the specific circumstances of this case warranted dismissal.
The Solicitor General’s report highlighted that the successful prosecution of the case hinged on the testimony of the complainant herself. Given her repeated non-appearance at hearings and her subsequent formal, voluntary affidavit of desistance where she characterized the complaint as based on a “misunderstanding,” the investigating authority concluded that the allegations could no longer be substantiated. The Court, in concurrence, found no compelling reason to proceed sua sponte without the essential testimony that would prove the charges. The dismissal, therefore, was based on the practical impossibility of proving the case due to the loss of the complaining witness, not merely on the desistance itself. The resolution underscores that while disbarment is for the public welfare, the Court must still act on the basis of evidence, and its dismissal here was due to the insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of professional misconduct.