AC 5908; (October, 2004) (Digest)
A.C. No. 5908; October 25, 2004
Antonio B. Ramos and Ma. Regina Paz R. De Dios, complainants, vs. Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna, respondent.
FACTS
Complainants charged respondent Atty. Pallugna with gross misconduct. In a civil case concerning ownership of a business, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary temporary restraining order (TRO) on October 23, 2002, directing his client to cease management acts and not to prevent the complainants from entering for inventory. This TRO was enforced on October 28, 2002, after a bond was posted. However, on October 25, 2002, respondent had filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) seeking to quash the trial court’s TRO. On November 13, 2002, the CA issued a resolution ordering the trial judge to “resist from implementing” his earlier orders, pending further proceedings.
Respondent, using the CA resolution, then filed a “Motion to Restore Possession” in the trial court and, in a letter dated November 14, 2002, requested police assistance from the Cagayan de Oro City Police Director to implement what he termed a “TRO” from the CA. On November 19, 2002, police personnel assisted in retaking the premises. Complainants allege this implementation was forceful and that respondent misrepresented the CA resolution, which was merely an order directed at the trial judge to halt further implementation, not a judicial mandate to restore possession to his client.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Atty. Pallugna violated the Code of Professional Responsibility through his actions in relation to the CA resolution and its implementation.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court found respondent guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that the CA’s November 13 resolution was a restraining order directed only at the public respondent judge, prohibiting him from enforcing his own earlier orders. It was not a TRO or injunction issued against the private parties (the complainants) nor an order to restore possession. By labeling it as a “TRO” in his communication to the police and by filing a motion to restore possession based on it, respondent misrepresented its legal effect. His actions constituted a deliberate misuse of a judicial directive to gain a tactical advantage after the trial court’s TRO had already been implemented. This demonstrated a lack of candor, fairness, and honesty required of a lawyer as an officer of the court. The Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for three months.
