G.R. No. 5688; June 4, 2009
Felipe E. Abella, Complainant, vs. Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra, Respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Felipe E. Abella charged respondent Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra, then Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City, with engaging in the private practice of law without the required authorization, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713. The complainant alleged that the respondent, while a government employee, was commissioned as a notary public on February 29, 1988, and had notarized thousands of documents without securing prior written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice. He contended this activity conflicted with her official duties and prejudiced her efficiency.
In her defense, respondent admitted to acting as a notary public from 1988 to 1989 but claimed she had verbal authorization from her immediate superior, the Register of Deeds. She asserted she acted in good faith, believing such permission was sufficient, and emphasized she notarized only 135 documents, primarily for official purposes without charging fees, to facilitate public service. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors initially dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, prompting the complainant to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra is administratively liable for engaging in notarial practice without the requisite written authority from the Department of Justice head, while serving as a government lawyer.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found respondent administratively liable. The legal logic is anchored on the clear statutory prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and related civil service rules, which explicitly forbid public officials from engaging in private professional practice unless authorized by law or the Constitution, provided it does not conflict with official functions. Crucially, Memorandum Circular No. 17 requires written permission from the department head, a condition not satisfied by mere verbal approval from an immediate superior.
The Court rejected the respondent’s defense of good faith and reliance on her superior’s verbal consent. It emphasized that as a lawyer, she is presumed to know the law, and ignorance of a specific prohibition, especially one involving ethical standards for public officials, is not an excuse. The act of notarization constitutes the practice of law, and performing such acts without the mandated written authorization constitutes a violation. While the IBP recommended dismissal, the Supreme Court, exercising its ultimate disciplinary authority, held that the admitted facts established the infraction. However, considering the circumstances, including her cessation of the practice upon being reprimanded and the absence of proven corruption, the Court imposed the penalty of reprimand, consistent with its classification as a light offense under civil service rules, with a warning for future conduct.