G.R. No. A.C. No. 4467 October 10, 1997
SPOUSES GIL A. DE LEON and MERCEDES DE LEON, complainants, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 159, City of Pasig; CITY SHERIFF OF PASIG or his Deputy Sheriff who is expected to enforce the Orders herein challenged; and SPOUSES JOSE A. DE LEON & EVANGELINE DE LEON, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a dispute over a piece of land in Marikina City previously mortgaged by the late Marcelo de Leon to the GSIS. After foreclosure, the right to repurchase was awarded to his son, respondent Jose de Leon. Due to financial constraints, Jose and his brother, complainant Gil de Leon, entered into a memorandum of agreement. Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing Gil to repurchase the property from GSIS and agreed to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale with a right to repurchase in favor of Gil as security. Gil borrowed P600,000 from Traders Royal Bank, using the property as collateral, and redeemed it. GSIS executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jose. When Jose later sought to repurchase the property per their agreement, Gil refused.
Spouses Jose and Evangeline de Leon filed a case for Specific Performance (Civil Case No. 61270) against spouses Gil and Mercedes de Leon, which was dismissed and the dismissal became final. They then filed another case (Civil Case No. 61978) for nullification of documents and damages before respondent Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio. Complainant-spouses raised issues of forum-shopping and res judicata in their answer, but the judge did not resolve these and instead urged an amicable settlement. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, which the judge approved and rendered into a decision on May 6, 1993. The agreement stipulated that Gil would sell the property to a third party for P2.7 million within thirty days, give P1 million to Jose, retain P1.7 million to pay the bank loan, and allow Jose to stay on the property until sale.
Complainant-spouses later filed a motion to evaluate/amend the compromise agreement, claiming it was unfair, but this was opposed by Jose who moved for execution. When complainants did not comply, Judge Bonifacio issued an order directing them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale with assumption of mortgage; otherwise, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Lorifel Pahimna, would sign on their behalf. The judge also enjoined the bank from foreclosing. After complainants’ motion for reconsideration was denied and they refused to sign, the Clerk of Court signed the deed on their behalf. Complainant-spouses filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was pending. They then filed this administrative complaint, alleging respondent judge and clerk of court violated the graft law through manifest partiality, bad faith, or negligence by authorizing the sale by non-owners and allowing the clerk to sign without authority, and by ignoring the issues of res judicata and forum-shopping.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio and Clerk of Court Atty. Lorifel Pahimna should be held administratively liable for violations of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and/or inexcusable negligence in handling Civil Case No. 61978.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the administrative complaint. The Court ruled that the issues raised by the complainants—specifically the validity of the judge’s orders directing the Clerk of Court to sign the deed and the alleged disregard of res judicata and forum-shopping—were judicial in nature and the very same issues pending before the Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition. Addressing them in the administrative case would preempt the appellate court’s resolution. The Court found no evidence of bad faith, which requires a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity, not mere bad judgment or negligence. The questioned orders were based on a compromise agreement voluntarily entered by the parties and the decision rendered therefrom. Good faith is presumed, and absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, a judge’s acts in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. The complaint failed to substantiate the charges of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence.