AC 3180; (June, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 3180 June 29, 1988
RICARDO L. PARAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE REYNALDO ROURA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55, MACABEBE, PAMPANGA, ATTY. FRUMENCIO C. PULGAR and MR. DIOSDADO CARREON, DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55, MACABEBE, PAMPANGA, respondents.
FACTS
This administrative complaint arose from the execution of a final judgment in a criminal case where Oscar G. Tiglao, a former driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), was found liable for damages. After a writ of execution against Tiglao was returned unsatisfied, respondent Judge Reynaldo Roura issued an order for a subsidiary writ of execution against PRBL as the employer. PRBL’s motions were denied. On December 6, 1986, respondent Deputy Sheriff Diosdado Carreon issued the subsidiary writ and later levied upon a PRBL bus, scheduling a public auction for March 6, 1987. PRBL filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 3, 1987, the CA issued a resolution and a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the respondents from implementing the writ and proceeding with the sale “until further Order from this court.”
The TRO was served on the respondents. However, on March 30, 1987, respondent Atty. Frumencio Pulgar, counsel for the judgment creditor, wrote to Sheriff Carreon, citing Batas Pambansa Blg. 224 and relevant jurisprudence, stating that the TRO had expired on March 24, 1987, and requested the sheriff to proceed with the sale on April 10, 1987. Acting on this, Sheriff Carreon issued a new notice of sale for April 14, 1987. PRBL filed urgent motions with the CA and the trial court to stop the sale. Respondent Judge Roura denied PRBL’s ex-parte motion on April 14, 1987, declaring it moot as the auction had already been conducted that same day, with the judgment creditor as the highest bidder.
ISSUE
Whether respondents Judge Roura, Atty. Pulgar, and Deputy Sheriff Carreon are administratively liable for implementing the subsidiary writ of execution and proceeding with the auction sale on April 14, 1987, allegedly in violation of the Court of Appeals’ Temporary Restraining Order dated March 3, 1987.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The legal logic centers on the statutory lifespan of a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. The complainant argued that the phrase “until further Order from this court” in the CA’s March 3 resolution meant the TRO was effective indefinitely until lifted. The Court rejected this interpretation. It applied Section 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, which incorporates the provision of B.P. Blg. 224. This law explicitly limits the effectivity of a TRO issued by any court, including the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court), to a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.
The Court clarified that the Interim Rules were precisely crafted to standardize this limitation across all inferior courts, including the appellate court. Therefore, the TRO issued on March 3, 1987, automatically expired by operation of law on March 24, 1987, twenty days after its service. Consequently, there was no legally subsisting TRO in effect by April 14,
