G.R. No. A.C. No. 2474; June 30, 2005
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., complainant, vs. Atty. Leo J. Palma, respondent.

FACTS

Atty. Leo J. Palma, while lawfully married to Elizabeth Hermosisima, contracted a second marriage in Hong Kong on June 22, 1982, with Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the 22-year-old daughter of his client, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. The complainant filed a disbarment case on November 8, 1982, alleging grossly immoral conduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath. The case underwent protracted proceedings, initially referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and later transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline after the Court issued a restraining order in 1984 pending a related civil case.
During the IBP proceedings, respondent repeatedly sought postponements and failed to present his evidence despite being granted a final opportunity to submit his direct testimony via affidavit. Consequently, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. The IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty and recommended a one-year suspension. However, the Supreme Court, in its Decision dated September 15, 2004, imposed the penalty of disbarment. Respondent filed a motion to vacate the decision, raising multiple procedural and substantive arguments.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court’s Decision disbarring Atty. Leo J. Palma should be vacated or reconsidered.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion and affirmed the disbarment. The Court systematically rejected all of respondent’s arguments. First, it held that disbarment proceedings are of public interest, and any person, including the complainant who was the father of the second wife and a betrayed client, can initiate them to determine a lawyer’s fitness. Second, respondent was not denied due process; his failure to present evidence was due to his own repeated delays and non-compliance with IBP orders after being given ample opportunity.
Third, the 1984 restraining order on the OSG did not void the subsequent IBP proceedings, as the transfer was in accordance with the new Rule 139-B. Fourth, laches did not apply because the delay was partly attributable to the respondent’s own actions and the Court’s earlier order. Fifth, the IBP’s recommended penalty is merely advisory and does not attain finality without Supreme Court approval. Finally, on the merits, respondent’s act of contracting a bigamous marriage constituted grossly immoral conduct. His claim of a “firm conviction” that his first marriage was void, absent a judicial declaration, was untenable. The Court emphasized that his actions betrayed the trust of his client and demonstrated moral unfitness to remain a member of the Bar. Providing for his children did not mitigate the transgression. Disbarment stands.