G.R. No. A.C. No. 141-J, August 31, 1970
SERGIO F. DEL CASTILLO, Complainant, v. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Respondent.

FACTS

This is an administrative case filed by complainant Sergio F. del Castillo against respondent Judge Rafael C. Climaco of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on January 29, 1969. The charges are threefold: (1) that the respondent judge intentionally delayed the hearing of Civil Case No. 94 (a partition case filed in 1962) because the lawyer for the defendants, Atty. Vivencio Ibrado, Sr., who was also a defendant, was his friend; (2) that in the same case, the judge compelled the plaintiffs to mark all their documentary evidence at once by indicating the pages of the record where the documents were found, instead of following the customary procedure of formal marking and presentation during trial, and that he lost patience, left the court, and continued the proceeding by telephone; and (3) that he tried to coerce the plaintiffs into a compromise with the defendants despite knowing there was no prospect for one, thereby unnecessarily delaying the case. The respondent judge filed his answer, and the case was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Arsenio Solidum for investigation. A hearing was held on August 28, 1969, where only the complainant appeared and testified; the respondent submitted the case based on his answer.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Rafael C. Climaco is administratively liable for the charges of intentional delay, improper trial procedure, and coercion to compromise in Civil Case No. 94.

RULING

The Court, adopting the findings and recommendation of Investigator Justice Arsenio Solidum, dismissed the complaint and absolved respondent Judge of all charges.
– On the first charge (intentional delay due to friendship): The charge was not sufficiently established. There was no proof that the respondent intentionally delayed the case because of his friendship with Atty. Ibrado, both being members of the Rotary Club of Bacolod. The respondent had resigned from the club before receiving the complaint, as his son was being considered for a scholarship grant.
– On the second charge (improper marking of evidence and leaving court): The respondent admitted adjourning the trial abruptly on February 14, 1967, but explained it was because the complainant, as counsel, had about 20 documents to mark, and after an hour, little progress was made due to the voluminous records. The respondent directed the complainant to proceed with marking in the presence of the deputy clerk. The investigator found nothing wrong with this procedure, and the hearing was adjourned at 3:25 PM.
– On the third charge (coercion to compromise): The respondent admitted exerting efforts to achieve a compromise, as the parties were close relatives (brothers and sisters). This actuation was deemed proper, as the law (Article 222 of the New Civil Code) expressly directs advising litigants, especially family members, to compromise their differences.
The complaint was dismissed.