A.C. No. 13674, August 1, 2023
Monette Manauis-Taggueg, Complainant, vs. Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg, Respondent.

FACTS

This is a dissenting opinion in a disbarment case. The majority ruled to disbar the respondent, Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg, for gross immorality. The dissenting opinion disagrees with the penalty. The proven acts of the respondent, as narrowed down by the majority, were entering an extramarital affair, living with a woman not his wife, and flaunting his affair to the public. The evidence failed to prove that the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage.

ISSUE

Whether the penalty of disbarment is appropriate for the respondent’s proven acts of gross immorality, or whether suspension from the practice of law is the sufficient and commensurate penalty.

RULING

The dissenting opinion votes to SUSPEND Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg from the practice of law for three years. The opinion argues that disbarment should be a last resort and is not warranted in this case. The respondent’s actions do not meet the three circumstances where disbarment for indiscretions should be reserved: (a) the acts are repeated, (b) they result in permanent rearrangements causing extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) they are prima facie shown to have violated the law. First, the respondent was not shown to have repeatedly entered extramarital affairs. Second, the facts do not show his acts caused a permanent rearrangement with extraordinary difficulty; the complainant did not allege a refusal of support or complete abdication of his paternal role. Third, he did not commit any act that prima facie violates the law. Furthermore, it has not been shown that his transgressions impacted his duties as a lawyer or that maintaining his license would reduce public confidence in the legal profession. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, aimed at preserving the purity of the legal profession, and should not be used as a vehicle for asserting private rights. The determination of immorality must be based on secular moral standards, not religious morality, and must relate to the lawyer’s conduct as an officer of the court. Citing precedent, the opinion notes that in a similar case (Juni v. Juni), where a lawyer cohabited and had children with another woman while married, the Court imposed a five-year suspension, not disbarment. In contrast, disbarment was justified in another case (Saludares v. Saludares) where the lawyer’s actions caused extraordinary difficulty on his relationship with his children. Since the respondent’s acts do not reach the threshold for disbarment, a three-year suspension is deemed commensurate.