AC 13601 Gaerlan (Digest)
G.R. No. A.C. No. 13601, April 17, 2023
MARY ANN B. CASTRO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ZELDANIA D.T. SORIANO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
The complainant, Mary Ann B. Castro, filed a complaint for suspension and disbarment against Atty. Zeldania D.T. Soriano for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and Canons 7 and 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The respondent, representing her client Alegria A. Castro, sent a Legal Notice to spouses Ferdinand and Rowena Sendin. The notice pertained to the sale of two parcels of land registered under the names of Constancio Castro and Rosario Castro-Mariano, which Alegria claimed to own by virtue of a written instrument of sale. The notice alleged that Joselito S. Castro (Alegria’s estranged husband) sold the property to the Sendin spouses using a forged Special Power of Attorney from the registered owners. In paragraph 6 of the Legal Notice, the respondent referred to the complainant as the “mistress” of Joselito, stating the spouses “grabbed the cheap offer of Joselito and his mistress Mary Ann B. Castro.”
ISSUE
Whether the respondent violated Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR by using the word “mistress” in the Legal Notice, thereby using language that is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
RULING
The dissenting opinion holds that the respondent violated Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR. The use of the word “mistress” was not relevant to the subject matter of the Legal Notice, which was to inform the Sendin spouses of Alegria’s claimed ownership and the forgery of the SPA. The complainant’s alleged relationship with Joselito had no connection to the sale of the property or Alegria’s ownership claim. The term “mistress” is derogatory and imputes a crime (concubinage) to the complainant without a court judgment validating the marriages involved. The respondent’s purpose could have been achieved without using such language. The dissent cites analogous cases (Spouses Nuezca v. Villagarcia, Washington v. Dicen, Buenviaje v. Magdamo, Velasco v. Causing) where lawyers were held liable for using intemperate, demeaning, or improper language that maligned character or imputed crimes. The dissent concludes that instead of dismissing the complaint, the Court should have admonished the respondent for the violation with a warning.
