G.R. No. A.C. No. 13035, June 27, 2023
Atty. Pablo B. Francisco, Complainant, vs. Atty. Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman, Respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Atty. Pablo B. Francisco filed a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman, a Department of Justice investigating prosecutor. The complaint arose from Atty. Suñega-Lagman’s dismissal of a criminal complaint for perjury filed by Atty. Francisco against officers of the Brookside Residents Association, Inc. (BRAI). Atty. Francisco was the respondent in a disciplinary case (CBD Case No. 18-5542) filed by the BRAI officers before the IBP. In that case, the BRAI officers, in their notarized Conference Brief, stipulated they were not yet officers when a Compromise Agreement with St. Louis Realty Corporation was executed on March 3, 2009. Atty. Francisco alleged this was a willful falsehood because one of the complainants, Antonio Medina, had signed the Agreement. He thus filed a perjury complaint. Atty. Suñega-Lagman dismissed the complaint, ruling the stipulated facts were mere proposals for stipulation that Atty. Francisco was free to accept or reject, and thus no deliberate assertion of falsehood could be attributed. Aggrieved, Atty. Francisco filed this administrative case, accusing Atty. Suñega-Lagman of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law for her dismissal of his perjury complaint.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Atty. Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman should be held liable for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Applying the guidelines established in Guevarra-Castil v. Trinidad, the Court first determined it had jurisdiction because the allegations, if true, would touch upon the respondent’s continuing obligations as a lawyer. On the merits, the Court found no basis for administrative liability. A prosecutor’s duty is to determine probable cause, and their discretion in doing so is generally not subject to administrative sanction unless exercised with arbitrariness, malice, or dishonesty. The Court agreed with Atty. Suñega-Lagman’s analysis that statements in a conference brief for pre-trial are mere proposals for stipulation, not definitive assertions under oath that would satisfy the element of a “deliberate assertion of falsehood” required for perjury. Her resolution was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion based on her legal evaluation and not indicative of gross ignorance of the law, bad faith, or malice. The Court emphasized that not every error in judgment renders a lawyer administratively liable, and the complainant failed to prove that the respondent’s actions were tainted with any wrongful motive or gross incompetence equivalent to malpractice. The complaint was dismissed.