G.R. No. L-17663 May 30, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The prosecution filed an information charging Isauro Santiago with libel. It alleged that on October 5, 1959, in Manila, Santiago, during a political speech delivered before a crowd using an amplifier system, publicly called Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson “Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde” and accused him of raping a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee at Shellborne Hotel. These statements were alleged to be false, malicious, and defamatory.
The defendant moved to quash the information, contending that the act charged constituted oral defamation, not libel. Since the information was filed on August 11, 1960, which was more than six months after the alleged October 1959 incident, he argued the crime had already prescribed. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion to quash, prompting the prosecution to appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the defamatory statements, uttered through an amplifier system during a speech, constitute libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code or oral defamation (slander) under Article 358.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order quashing the information, ruling that the crime charged was oral defamation, which had prescribed. The Court meticulously distinguished between libel and oral defamation based on the means of publication. Libel under Article 355 is committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. The prosecution argued that an amplifier system was a means similar to “radio.”
The Court rejected this argument. It clarified that “radio” involves the transmission via electromagnetic waves without conducting wires, whereas an amplifier system typically uses wires to transmit sound. More critically, the Court emphasized the common characteristic of all the enumerated means in Article 355: their permanent nature as a means of publication. This permanence justifies the graver penalty for libel compared to oral defamation. Extemporaneous speech, even if amplified electronically to reach a larger audience, lacks this element of permanence. The Court cited American jurisprudence indicating that reading a prepared manuscript over the radio constitutes libel, but extemporaneous defamatory remarks during a broadcast do not. Consequently, the allegations constituted oral defamation under Article 358, which prescribes in six months. The information, filed over ten months after the incident, was thus filed out of time.