G.R. No. L-16018. March 31, 1964.
JOSE BUMANGLAG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MELECIO BARAOIDAN and HILARION BARAOIDAN, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On December 31, 1949, Jose Bumanglag filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against Melecio and Hilarion Baraoidan to recover ownership and possession of a parcel of land. Bumanglag alleged he inherited the land from his parents and that in 1930, his father allowed the defendants’ father, Juan Baraoidan, to clear and cultivate a portion under an agreement that the produce would belong to the developer until the land was fully developed, after which the harvest would be shared equally. After Juan’s death, the defendants continued as tenants but began asserting ownership, prompting Bumanglag’s father to file an action for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. 3841) in 1935.
The defendants moved to dismiss the 1949 complaint on the ground of prescription, citing the prior 1935 case. They noted that the 1935 case was dismissed upon the plaintiff’s own motion in 1936 and argued the present action, filed thirteen years later, was barred. The lower court initially denied the motion to dismiss and admitted Bumanglag’s amended complaint. However, on October 4, 1958, the court reversed itself and dismissed the complaint, holding that the 1936 dismissal order in the prior case barred the present action under the principle of res judicata.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3841 in 1936 upon the plaintiff’s motion bars the present 1949 action for recovery of ownership and possession on the ground of res judicata.

RULING

No, the dismissal does not constitute res judicata. The Supreme Court clarified the legal effect of the 1936 dismissal order. The 1935 complaint (Civil Case No. 3841) was an action primarily for ejectment (“evicting” the defendants) and recovery of damages. The order of dismissal was issued upon the motion of the plaintiff (Bumanglag’s father) with the conformity of the defendants. This dismissal was governed by Section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), which was in force at the time. Under this provision, a court could, in its discretion, allow a plaintiff to dismiss an action at any time before final judgment, and such a dismissal “shall not be a bar to another action for the same cause.”
The Court applied this rule strictly. Since the statute explicitly stated that a voluntary dismissal is not a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause, it logically follows, a fortiori, that it cannot bar a subsequent action that is not identical. The present 1949 action is fundamentally different as it is principally an action to recover ownership (accion reivindicatoria), not merely possession. Therefore, the lower court erred in applying res judicata. The order of dismissal was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits of Bumanglag’s claim of ownership.