G.R. No. L-18114; June 29, 1962
JOSE P. VELEZ and JESUS P. VELEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. GUSTAVO VICTORIANO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MIGUEL CUENCO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Miguel Cuenco filed complaints with the Manila City Fiscal against petitioners Jose and Jesus Velez for alleged violations of Section 16 of the Coal Land Act (Act 2719, as amended by R.A. 740), pertaining to the submission of false sworn reports. The petitioners moved to quash, arguing that the Manila courts lacked jurisdiction because all acts constituting the alleged offense—the preparation, signing, and swearing of the reports—occurred in Cebu City, where the reports were coursed through Mineral District No. 4. The investigating fiscal denied the motion, noting that while the reports were prepared in Cebu, they were addressed and submitted to the Director of Mines in Manila. After the City Fiscal affirmed this denial, petitioners sought prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was also denied. Subsequently, informations for perjury were filed, and Judge Victoriano ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which refused to give it due course, ruling the offense was transitory and the petition premature. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. They thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court, contesting the Court of Appeals’ resolution and arguing that respondent Cuenco had no legal standing to initiate the complaint and that perjury is not a transitory offense, vesting jurisdiction exclusively in the Cebu courts.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the perjury cases filed against the petitioners under the Coal Land Act, given that the sworn reports were prepared and sworn to in Cebu but were addressed to the Director of Mines in Manila.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the jurisdiction of the Manila court. On the preliminary matter of standing, the Court found that respondent Miguel Cuenco, as an alleged part-owner of funds involved, had a sufficient interest to provide information to the fiscal. His participation did not constitute improper interference, as the fiscal and judge independently exercised their official discretion in filing the cases and issuing the warrants.
On the central issue of venue and jurisdiction, the Court applied the doctrine established in U.S. vs. Cañete. The legal logic hinges on the nature of the offense defined under Section 16 of the Coal Land Act, which punishes the making of a false oath in statements required to be submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (through the Director of Mines). The Court ruled that the situs of the crime of perjury in this context is not merely where the affidavit is physically executed and sworn, but where the false sworn statement is ultimately presented or submitted as evidence. Since the reports, though prepared in Cebu, were required to be and were addressed to the Director of Mines in Manila, the offense was deemed committed in Manila. The gist of the offense is the intentional submission of false evidence to the authority in Manila. Consequently, the transitory nature of the offense allowed venue to be laid in Manila, where the effects of the criminal act were felt and where the official duty to act on the reports was located. Therefore, the Court of First Instance of Manila properly acquired jurisdiction.