GR L 17444; (June, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17444; June 30, 1962
MARIA ELLI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JUAN DITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Maria Elli and Juan Elli filed a forcible entry case against defendants Juan Ditan and Marcial Bronola in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bacon, Sorsogon. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants to restore possession and pay damages. The defendants, represented by Atty. Fernando Gerona, Jr., filed a notice of appeal. The record was elevated to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The Clerk of Court sent a “Notice of Appealed Case” to the parties themselves via registered mail, which they received on various dates in August and September 1959.
The defendants failed to file an Answer in the CFI. Consequently, the plaintiffs moved to declare the defendants in default. The CFI granted the motion and, after an ex-parte hearing, rendered a judgment against the defaulted defendants. The defendants, still through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration. They argued that they could not be validly declared in default because the required notice from the CFI was sent to them directly and not to their counsel of record. They contended that such service was invalid, as all notices must be served upon their attorney.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance validly acquired jurisdiction to declare the defendants in default by serving the notice of the appealed case directly upon the defendants instead of upon their counsel of record.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court set aside the CFI’s order declaring the defendants in default and remanded the case. The Court clarified the interplay between Section 2, Rule 27 (now Rule 13) and Section 7, Rule 40 (now Rule 40) of the Rules of Court. Section 7, Rule 40 provides that upon docketing of an appealed ejectment case, the clerk must notify the parties by registered mail, and the period to answer begins from the defendant’s receipt. However, this rule must be read in conjunction with the general provision in Section 2, Rule 27, which mandates that when a party appears by an attorney, service of every pleading, order, notice, and paper must be made upon said attorney, unless the court orders service upon the party himself.
The word “parties” in Section 7, Rule 40 is used generically, considering that litigants in inferior courts often appear without counsel. The moment a party is represented by an attorney in a court of record, as the defendants were from the inception of their appeal, the legal presumption is that the attorney is the agent of the client for all procedural purposes. Consequently, notice to the client and not to the attorney is not a notice in law. The Supreme Court cited the doctrine in Palad v. Cui, which holds that where a party appears by attorney, all required notices must be given to the attorney. Since the notice of the appealed case was sent to the defendants personally and not to their counsel, there was no valid service. Therefore, the period for the defendants to file their Answer never commenced, and the CFI erred in declaring them in default. The order of default was void for lack of proper notice.
