G.R. No. L-17608-09 July 31, 1962
VICTORIANA SAGUCIO, plaintiff-respondent-appellant, vs. ADRIANO BULOS, defendant-petitioner-appellee.

FACTS

Victoriana Sagucio, daughter of homestead patentee Andres Sagucio, filed an action for legal redemption of a 21-hectare homestead land sold to Adriano Bulos in 1944. The Court of First Instance of Isabela, in a 1954 decision affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court in 1956, recognized Sagucio’s right to repurchase the property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 141 ). The final judgment ordered Bulos to execute a deed of conveyance upon Sagucio’s payment of the repurchase price.
In 1959, Bulos filed a separate action to quiet title, alleging Sagucio’s redemption right had prescribed due to her failure to exercise it within the five-year period from the sale as stated in Section 119. Sagucio, in turn, filed a motion for execution of the 1954 judgment in the redemption case. The trial court consolidated the issues and, based on a stipulation of facts, ruled in favor of Bulos. It denied Sagucio’s motion for execution, declared her right to repurchase had prescribed, and affirmed Bulos as the absolute owner. Sagucio appealed this ruling.

ISSUE

Whether Victoriana Sagucio’s right to repurchase the homestead property had prescribed, thereby barring the execution of the final and executory judgment in her favor.

RULING

No, the right to repurchase had not prescribed, and execution of the final judgment was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision. The Court clarified that the five-year redemption period under Section 119 of the Public Land Act was interrupted by the judicial action (Civil Case No. 142) Sagucio filed in 1948. This interruption ceased only upon the finality of the Supreme Court’s judgment affirming her right on October 26, 1956. The prescriptive period began to run anew from that date. Consequently, her motion for execution filed on July 10, 1959, was well within the new five-year period.
Furthermore, the execution of the final judgment was governed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, which allows execution by motion within five years from finality. The Public Land Act contains no conflicting procedural rule for executing such judgments. Applying the Rules suppletorily was both practicable and aligned with the state’s avowed policy to preserve homestead ownership for the patentee’s family. The Court emphasized that Bulos would not be prejudiced, as his original investment was compensated by years of enjoying the property’s fruits. The Court ordered Bulos to execute the deed of reconveyance in accordance with the terms of the final judgment.