GR L 19374; (June, 1964) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19374, June 30, 1964
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE F. MONROY, doing business under the Trade Name and Style of “AVENUE ICE DROP FACTORY,” defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint in March 1961 to revive a judgment rendered by the Manila Court of First Instance in May 1949. The 1949 judgment ordered defendant Jose F. Monroy to pay PNB the sum of P12,000.00 with 7% interest from August 8, 1947, plus attorney’s fees and costs. In the revival action, Monroy was declared in default for failure to file an answer. PNB duly proved the existence of the judgment and Monroy’s non-payment.
The trial court, however, motu proprio dismissed PNB’s complaint. It held that the action had already prescribed, reasoning that more than ten years had elapsed from the date the judgment was rendered in May 1949 to the filing of the revival action in March 1961. PNB appealed, arguing that prescription is a defense that is deemed waived if not pleaded, and thus the court could not raise it on its own initiative.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of prescription.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the procedural issue of whether prescription could be motu proprio considered, as the dismissal was erroneous on substantive grounds. The trial court mistakenly computed the prescriptive period from the date the judgment was rendered (May 1949). Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the ten-year period for enforcing a judgment by action prescribes from the time the judgment becomes final. The date of finality is distinct from and necessarily later than the date of rendition.
The complaint for revival alleged the date of the judgment’s rendition but did not allege the date it became final. Therefore, based solely on the factual allegations of the complaint, it was impossible to conclude definitively that more than ten years had passed from the finality of the judgment. The legal conclusion of prescription was thus improperly drawn from an incomplete factual premise. Since the existence and non-payment of the judgment debt were otherwise established, the Supreme Court ordered Monroy to pay PNB the amount stated in the 1949 judgment, with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.