AM L 363; (July, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-363. July 31, 1962. IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ.
FACTS
Respondent Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez was convicted of murder for the killing of Filemon Samaco, former mayor of Calapan, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by this Court. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by his position as municipal mayor at the time and the use of a motor vehicle. Subsequently, on August 19, 1958, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President, which remitted the unexecuted portion of his prison term on the condition that he would not again violate any penal law.
On October 9, 1958, the widow of the victim filed a verified complaint seeking Gutierrez’s disbarment under Rule 127, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which allows removal or suspension of a lawyer upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. In his answer, Gutierrez admitted the facts of his conviction and pardon but invoked the defense established in In re Lontok, arguing that the pardon barred the disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether a conditional pardon granted to a lawyer after conviction for murder, a crime involving moral turpitude, precludes his disbarment under Rule 127, Section 5.
RULING
No. The conditional pardon does not preclude disbarment. The Court distinguished the present case from In re Lontok, which involved an absolute pardon. An absolute pardon “blots out the existence of guilt” and restores civil rights, potentially barring disbarment based solely on the conviction. However, Gutierrez’s pardon was merely conditional, remitting only the unexecuted portion of his sentence without wiping out the guilt or the fact of conviction itself. Therefore, the rationale of Lontok is inapplicable.
The Court held that murder is a crime involving moral turpitude, defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to the duties owed to society. The practice of law is a privilege demanding continuous adherence to high standards of moral fitness. Gutierrez’s conviction, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of official position, demonstrates a degree of moral turpitude that justifies removal from the legal profession. The conditional pardon does not absolve him from the professional consequences of his crime. Accordingly, Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.