G.R. No. L-19023 July 31, 1964
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PROVINCIAL FISCAL MARTIN PAULATE, and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR VICENTE ORENDAIN, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. GERONIMO MARAVE, Judge of the CFI of Sulu, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF SULU, BENJAMIN R. ABUBAKAR, ASST. PROVINCIAL WARDEN ENRIQUE TEACKLE PC SGT. AMIL ALPASAIN, PC CPL. DANIEL PALILEO, and thirteen other JOHN DOES, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a confrontation at the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in Jolo, Sulu. Following the Provincial Board’s abolition of the position of Special Counsel, Provincial Governor Benjamin Abubakar, accompanied by armed personnel and prisoners, proceeded to physically close the special counsel’s office by nailing bamboo splits across the doorway. Upon arrival, Provincial Fiscal Martin Paulate confronted the Governor, declaring the act illegal and asserting his office’s independence from the local executive under the Department of Justice. The Governor retorted with a threat of personal violence if the Fiscal interfered.
Consequently, an information for direct assault with grave coercion was filed against Governor Abubakar and his companions. After a preliminary investigation, the respondent Judge issued an order dated August 29, 1961. The order opined that the evidence did not establish the crime of assault upon a person in authority, suggesting the act might constitute coercion instead, and found insufficient evidence against some accused. It directed the Special Prosecutor to amend the information accordingly within ten days, threatening dismissal if he failed to act. The Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration instead, which was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the August 29, 1961 order, which petitioners treated as a dismissal or acquittal without trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling it was premature. The Court held that the assailed order was not a final dismissal or an acquittal. Legally, an acquittal presupposes a trial on the merits after arraignment, which had not yet occurred. The order was merely an interlocutory directive giving the prosecution a leeway to amend the information based on the judge’s preliminary assessment of the evidence from the investigation. The threatened dismissal was conditional upon the prosecutor’s inaction, not an immediate final disposition.
The legal logic centers on the propriety of certiorari, which requires a showing of grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The Court found no such capricious, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment in the order. The judge was acting within his authority at a preliminary stage. The proper recourse for the prosecutor was to either comply with the directive or await the court’s subsequent action upon his refusal. Any unreasonable action from the court following that would then be the appropriate time to seek judicial review. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are not remedies for interlocutory orders issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings absent a clear showing of grave abuse, which was not present. The preliminary injunction was dissolved.