G.R. No. 234186 , November 21, 2018
Union School International, et al. v. Charley Jane Dagdag

FACTS

This case originated from the termination of respondent Charley Jane Dagdag, an unmarried teacher, by petitioner Union School International due to her pregnancy out of wedlock. The school cited her condition as a violation of its code of conduct, constituting disgraceful and immoral behavior warranting dismissal. The labor tribunals ruled in favor of Dagdag, finding the dismissal illegal. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower rulings, holding that pregnancy out of wedlock, by itself, is not a valid cause for termination under the Labor Code.
In the main Decision, the Court, through Justice Tijam, applied existing jurisprudence, particularly Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College and Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital, which established that the pregnancy of an unmarried employee does not automatically amount to disgraceful or immoral conduct justifying dismissal, especially when the child’s father is also unmarried. The Court found no grossly immoral circumstances in Dagdag’s case and ordered her reinstatement with full backwages.

ISSUE

The core legal issue, as framed in the concurring opinion, is whether an unmarried woman’s liberty interest to engage in consensual sexual relations and bear a child is a fundamental right, the infringement of which requires strict judicial scrutiny of state or employer action.

RULING

Justice Jardeleza, in his Concurring Opinion, agreed with the disposition but sought to elevate the doctrinal foundation. He argued that the liberty interest of an unmarried woman to engage in consensual relations and bear a child should be recognized as a fundamental right under the constitutional guarantee of liberty and due process. This recognition would shift the standard of review from the deferential rational basis test to strict scrutiny, requiring the government or a private employer acting under state regulation to demonstrate a compelling state interest and use the least restrictive means when infringing upon this right.
The opinion builds this argument by tracing the right to privacy in Philippine jurisprudence, citing Morfe v. Mutuc, which adopted the U.S. doctrine from Griswold v. Connecticut. It further relies on Leus and Capin-Cadiz, which refused to penalize unmarried pregnancy absent grossly immoral circumstances. Jardeleza posits that these precedents implicitly acknowledge a protected sphere of personal autonomy encompassing intimate decisions on sexuality and procreation. He contends that failing to recognize this as fundamental leads to a violation of equal protection, as it results in discriminatory treatment where only women face employment termination for a condition arising from consensual acts involving two parties. The concurrence thus urges the Court to explicitly declare this liberty interest as fundamental, thereby providing stronger constitutional protection against discriminatory employment policies based on marital status and pregnancy.