G.R. No. L-38840 December 3, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE PIO B. FERANDOS, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Toledo City Branch IX and BERNARDO CALANG, respondents.

FACTS

An information for murder was filed against ten individuals, including respondent Bernardo Calang, for the 1966 ambush-killing of a geologist. After pleading not guilty, two accused were discharged as state witnesses. During trial, after the prosecution had presented three witnesses, the lawyers for five of the remaining accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The City Fiscal agreed to this plea bargain. The trial court, Judge Pio B. Ferandos presiding, allowed the amendment of the information from murder to homicide by physically crossing out “murder” and writing “homicide,” and striking allegations of treachery and evident premeditation. The five accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced.
Calang, however, maintained his plea of not guilty to the amended information. The prosecution moved to adopt its previously presented evidence against him. Calang’s counsel stipulated on the corpus delicti, and the court admitted the prosecution’s documentary exhibits. After the prosecution rested, Calang filed a demurrer to the evidence. The trial court, in subsequent orders, granted Calang’s position that the amendment was substantive and effectively initiated a new case, thereby requiring the prosecution to re-present all its evidence against him. The prosecution petitioned the Supreme Court to annul this ruling.

ISSUE

Whether the amendment of the information from murder to homicide, effected after the prosecution had presented evidence, and over which Calang was re-arraigned, constitutes a substantive amendment that necessitates the re-presentation of the prosecution’s entire case against him.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the prosecution, setting aside the trial court’s orders. The amendment was not substantive in a manner that created a new and disconnected case requiring a retrial of the prosecution’s evidence. The legal logic is that the amendment merely reduced the severity of the charge by eliminating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, which was favorable to Calang. The core factual allegation—that Calang and others conspired to kill the victim—remained unchanged. The proceeding was a continuation of the original prosecution, not the commencement of a new action.
The Court emphasized that Calang was present during the initial presentation of evidence and his counsel cross-examined the witnesses. His subsequent re-arraignment did not negate the continuity of the case or erase the evidence already adduced. To require the prosecution to re-present its evidence would elevate a procedural formality over substantive justice, allowing a technicality to hinder the administration of justice. Calang was not denied due process, as he had full opportunity to contest the evidence. The trial court was directed to rule on his pending demurrer to the evidence based on the existing record.