G.R. No. L-21678; October 30, 1964
PHILIPPINE REALTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO SANTOS, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI; and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, herein represented by the LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Philippine Realtors, Inc. secured a final judgment of ejectment in 1959 against defendants occupying its 20,500-square-meter lot in Sampaloc, Manila. Despite various legal maneuvers by the defendants, including an appeal that was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court, the Municipal Court in August 1963 finally ordered the issuance of alias writs of execution and demolition to enforce the judgment. At this juncture, the Land Tenure Administration, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed an expropriation case (Civil Case No. 54648) over the same property. The complaint alleged the land was formerly part of Hacienda Tuazon, occupied by over forty tenant-families for more than ten years, and sought its condemnation under Republic Act No. 1400 (the Land Reform Act) for subdivision and sale to the occupants. The Court of First Instance issued a restraining order against the ejectment and demolition, prompting the petitioner to file the instant certiorari and prohibition case.

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether the subject urban land is expropriable by the government under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which authorizes the expropriation of landed estates for resale to their tenants.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the land is not expropriable, granting the writs of certiorari and prohibition. The legal logic is anchored on a consistent jurisprudential doctrine that the constitutional power to expropriate “landed estates” cannot be extended to small urban lots based solely on legislative declaration or historical connection to a larger hacienda. The Court, citing a long line of precedents including the recent case of Republic v. Manotok Realty, Inc., emphasized that the determinative factor is the present area or extension of the property, not the number of occupants or its past inclusion in a larger estate. The subject lot, measuring approximately 2.05 hectares, was deemed not a “landed estate” within the constitutional contemplation. The Court held that the legislature cannot, by fiat, declare a small parcel a landed estate simply because it was once part of one or is densely occupied. Consequently, the expropriation suit had no legal basis. The contested restraining order was set aside, and the respondent court was ordered to dismiss the condemnation case.