GR L 12894; (January, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-12894; January 28, 1961
LILIA JUANA BARLES, MARIA ESTRELLA BARLES and REMEDIOS BARLES, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. DON ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiffs-appellants, Lilia Juana Barles, Maria Estrella Barles, and Remedios Barles, filed a complaint for the declaration or investigation of their paternity against defendant-appellee Don Alfonso Ponce Enrile. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. On appeal, this Court, in a decision promulgated on September 30, 1960, reversed the lower court. The Court ruled that the action to investigate spurious paternity under Article 289 of the New Civil Code is similar to the action for recognition of natural children under Article 285. Consequently, the prescriptive period in Article 285, which generally requires the action to be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent, should apply by analogy in the absence of an express period for spurious children. The defendant-appellee now files this motion for reconsideration of that decision.
ISSUE
Whether the action to investigate spurious paternity under Article 289 of the New Civil Code prescribes within five years under Article 1149, or whether it is governed by the prescriptive periods specified in Article 285 for the recognition of natural children.
RULING
The motion for reconsideration is denied. The Court reaffirms that the action to investigate the paternity of spurious (illegitimate) children is governed by the prescriptive periods in Article 285, not by the general five-year period in Article 1149. The defendant-appellee’s contention that Article 285 is merely a condition precedent applicable only to natural children is untenable. Article 285 is clearly a statute of limitations, as established in prior jurisprudence. The argument that this provision should be in the Code’s general prescription chapter ignores that public policy considerations for paternity actions justify a special prescriptive rule, as noted by Spanish jurisprudence. Article 1148 of the Code itself states that the general rules on prescription are without prejudice to those specified elsewhere.
The Court rejects the argument that applying Article 285 to spurious children grants them better rights than natural children, contrary to the Code’s hierarchy. The ruling does not equate their status but applies a similar procedural limitation to a comparable action. The opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui is cited not in support of the movant, but to refute him, as it concludes that Article 285 limits actions for both recognition by natural children and investigation of paternity by other illegitimate children. Therefore, no legal basis exists to modify the Court’s original decision.