G.R. No. L-33007, June 18, 1976
VICENTE MIRANDA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, DY CHUN, DY SUAT HONG, DY LEE, DY SEKO, TAN HO NOLASCO DYCOTHAY (deceased), substituted by JOSE KOO ENG LIN DY, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of NOLASCO DYCOTHAY, “AGUSAN COMMERCIAL”, “EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO” “HIAP BEE”, and “EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO., INC.”, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Vicente Miranda, as administrator of the intestate estate of Hilarion Dydongco, filed a civil case for recovery of properties and accounting against private respondents. He alleged that the respondents, taking advantage of the decedent’s absence and subsequent death, fraudulently appropriated and operated his substantial business enterprises and properties. After trial, Judge Jose M. Mendoza rendered a decision on July 26, 1965, ordering respondents to deliver the properties to the estate, render a full accounting of fruits and proceeds, and pay damages and attorney’s fees.
Respondents moved for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied. They then attempted to perfect an appeal. The Supreme Court, in a 1968 resolution, deemed their appeal premature, as the judgment required an accounting which was a necessary incident for completing the relief. The case was remanded to the trial court, then presided by respondent Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr., solely for the implementation of the accounting phase.

ISSUE

Whether a trial judge can substantially alter or amend a final judgment on the merits rendered by his predecessor, beyond the reglementary period for appeal, under the guise of implementing an accounting phase ordered in said judgment.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared that respondent Judge Tantuico acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the 1965 decision of Judge Mendoza was a final judgment on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting. The remand of the case by the Supreme Court in 1968 was strictly for the implementation of the accounting as a mere incident to complete the relief; it was not a license to reopen the case or to review the substantive findings of the prior court.
The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of finality of judgments. A judgment that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties, such as one for recovery and accounting, is final and appealable. The accounting component is integral to the judgment but does not render it interlocutory. The Court explicitly abandoned the contrary doctrine in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and adopted the rule that judgments for recovery with accounting are final and appealable without awaiting the accounting results. If not appealed within the reglementary period, such a judgment becomes final and executory. Therefore, Judge Tantuico could not, four years later, assume appellate authority over his predecessor’s final judgment. His duty was merely to execute the accounting as ordered, not to re-examine or alter the adjudicated rights and liabilities.