G.R. No. L-20345, November 28, 1964
RICARDO HAUTEA, petitioner, vs. RAMON S. MAGALLON, as Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Zarraga and MANUEL SORIANO, respondents.

FACTS

On January 9, 1962, respondent Manuel O. Soriano filed a complaint for illegal detainer and damages against petitioner Ricardo Hautea in the Justice of the Peace Court of Zarraga, Iloilo. Soriano alleged that Hautea was his lessee of an agricultural land covered by T.C.T. No. 26492. The complaint charged Hautea with violating the lease contract by: (1) allowing 22 persons to enter and live on the property without Soriano’s knowledge or consent; and (2) damaging the land by destroying existing saltbeds and approximately sixty hectares of first-class rice land in an unsuccessful attempt to convert it into a fishpond, thereby causing the property’s value to deteriorate. Soriano further averred that, despite his demands, Hautea refused to restore the riceland to its original condition. Crucially, paragraph 5 of the complaint stated that sometime in December 1961, or more than thirty days before filing the complaint, Soriano made a written demand upon Hautea to turn over possession of the property, but Hautea refused.
Hautea moved to dismiss the complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court on two grounds: first, that it failed to allege jurisdictional facts because it did not state the specific date when he violated the lease terms, thus failing to show that the action was filed within the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases; and second, that the Justice of the Peace Court lacked jurisdiction because the action was essentially one for rescission (resolution) of the lease contract due to breach of terms, which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The Justice of the Peace, respondent Ramon S. Magallon, denied the motion to dismiss.
Hautea then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, seeking to enjoin the Justice of the Peace Court from proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance dismissed Hautea’s petition in an order dated August 10, 1962. Hautea’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Justice of the Peace Court of Zarraga, Iloilo, had jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case filed by Soriano against Hautea.
2. Whether the acceptance of rental payments by Soriano after the alleged breach gave rise to a new lease agreement, thereby barring the ejectment suit.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance, upholding the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court and dismissing the appeal.
On the first issue, the Court held that the Justice of the Peace Court validly acquired jurisdiction. Hautea contended that the complaint failed to allege a prior demand to comply with the lease conditions, as required by Section 2, Rule 72 (now Section 2, Rule 70) of the Rules of Court. The Court found this assertion incorrect, as paragraph 5 of the complaint explicitly stated that a written demand to vacate was made in December 1961, which was within one year prior to the filing of the complaint in January 1962. This allegation sufficiently established that the action was timely filed. The Court noted that Hautea was shifting his theory on appeal; in the lower court, his objection was based on the complaint’s failure to state the date of the violation, not the absence of a demand. A change in theory is not permissible on appeal under Section 18, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the Court rejected Hautea’s argument that the action was one for rescission of the lease contract exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Citing Article 1673 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Court ruled that a lessor may eject a lessee through an unlawful detainer action if the lessee violates the terms of the lease—such as by using the property in a manner that causes its deterioration—and, after demand by the lessor to comply and vacate, the lessee continues in unlawful possession. The action remains one for unlawful detainer, not rescission, and falls within the summary jurisdiction of the inferior court.
On the second issue, the Court found Hautea’s claim regarding the acceptance of rental payments to be without merit. The defense that Soriano’s acceptance of rent gave rise to a new lease agreement was irrelevant because the detainer action was not based on non-payment of rent but on violations of other lease conditions (i.e., unauthorized occupation and material damage to the property). Moreover, this defense was not raised in the Justice of the Peace Court and could not be considered for the first time in the certiorari proceedings before the Court of First Instance or on appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: For an unlawful detainer case to fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, the complaint must sufficiently allege (1) a violation of the lease terms by the lessee, (2) a demand by the lessor for the lessee to comply and vacate, and (3) that the action was filed within one year from the date of the last demand. The action remains one for unlawful detainer, not rescission, when it seeks to recover possession due to the lessee’s breach of conditions, provided a prior demand to vacate has been made. Defenses not raised in the inferior court cannot be entertained in subsequent certiorari proceedings or on appeal.