G.R. No. L-18739 December 28, 1964
SILVINO DE GOMA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ROSARIO DE GOMA, JOSE MONTALVO, JR., BEATRIZ B. MENDOZA, and her husband, RAFAEL B. MENDOZA, MACARIO M. OFILADA, in his capacity as Sheriff of the City of Manila, and Public Service Commission, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 39612 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Beatriz B. Mendoza obtained a default judgment for a sum of money against Rosario C. de Goma, the wife of plaintiff-appellant Silvino de Goma, who was also joined as a party defendant. Execution was levied on a certificate of public convenience in Rosario’s name for operating transportation units in Manila. The auction sale was held on June 22, 1959, with Jose Montalvo, Jr. as the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued. On March 18, 1960, Rosario de Goma, joined by her husband Silvino, filed an action (Civil Case No. 42787) against the defendants-appellees for annulment of the execution sale on the ground that a certificate of public convenience is not leviable property. The lower court held the sale valid and dismissed the complaint, which order became final. Execution was granted, and Montalvo’s application to the Public Service Commission for approval of the sale was approved. On April 11, 1961, Silvino de Goma alone, as administrator of the conjugal properties, filed the present action for annulment of the sale on a new ground: that his wife could not bind the conjugal properties without his consent, which he did not give for the original indebtedness. All defendants except Rosario moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order of dismissal on May 16, 1961, which is the subject of this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to bar the second action for annulment of the execution sale filed by Silvino de Goma alone, despite a different alleged ground for annulment.

RULING

Yes, the doctrine of res judicata applies. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The cause of action in both cases is the same: the legal wrong allegedly committed by the defendants through the sale on execution of the certificate of public convenience, with the same object and relief prayed for—annulment of the sale. The different grounds alleged (non-leviability in the first case, and lack of marital consent in the second) do not constitute distinct causes of action. A single cause of action may involve several issues, but a party cannot split it by filing separate complaints for each issue. Under Section 49(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judgment is conclusive not only as to matters directly adjudged but also as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. The alleged nullity of the sale encompasses both the leviability of the certificate and the factual questions of its conjugal nature and the wife’s authority to contract the debt. These related issues could and should have been raised in the first action. Allowing the second action would permit the splitting of a single cause of action, which is prohibited by the Rules, and would undermine the public interest in ending litigation and preventing harassment.