G.R. No. L-23537 March 31, 1965
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION, DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA and CECILIO T. SENO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE MODESTO R. RAMOLETE of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., and ROQUE ABELLAR, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. (Katipunan) is engaged in the lumber business. It maintains a regular permanent staff for routine operations and engages independent labor contractors for occasional work. For work not assigned to other contractors, Katipunan had a contract with Cirilo Cabasa. On August 18, 1964, Cabasa terminated his contract. Respondent Roque Abellar, who had similar contracts with other lumber companies, then entered into a written contract with Katipunan to furnish the labor previously supplied by Cabasa. On September 3, 1964, Katipunan and Abellar filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with a Preliminary Injunction (Civil Case No. R-8564) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Modesto R. Ramolete, against petitioners Democrito T. Mendoza, Cecilio T. Seno, and the Associated Labor Union. The complaint alleged harassing and coercive tactics by the petitioners, constituting illegal interference with the contractual obligations between Katipunan and Abellar, and asserted that no employer-employee relationship existed between Katipunan and Abellar’s laborers. On September 8, 1964, respondent Judge issued an ex parte Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond, restraining the petitioners from specific acts such as blocking trucks, molesting Abellar’s laborers, and persuading shipping companies or customers to refuse dealings with Katipunan. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to lift the writ, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction as the matter involved a labor dispute, that peaceful picketing cannot be enjoined, that Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act) should apply, and that an unfair labor practice case was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). Without waiting for the resolution of their motion, petitioners filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction before the Supreme Court, raising the same issues. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. The respondent Judge, in an Order dated September 17, 1964, deferred resolution on the motion to lift the injunction until evidence could be presented to determine if a labor dispute was involved and required petitioners to answer the complaint. Petitioners subsequently filed their Answer and participated in a pre-trial conference in the lower court.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the complaint and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, considering the petitioners’ claim that the matter involves a labor dispute over which the Court of First Instance allegedly has no jurisdiction.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court held that the petition for certiorari and prohibition was premature and that petitioners had not exhausted the remedies available in the lower court. The respondent Judge, predicated on the allegations of the complaint for damages arising from interference with contractual obligations, initially believed the court had jurisdiction. His conclusion, even if potentially erroneous, constituted a judicial error or mistake of law, not an act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. When a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders or decisions on questions pertaining to the cause are within its jurisdiction and cannot be corrected by certiorari, however irregular or erroneous they may be. The Court noted that petitioners had already filed their Answer and participated in a pre-trial in the lower court, indicating the availability of adequate remedies there. Should the lower court ultimately hold that it has jurisdiction, the proper remedy for the petitioners would be an appeal in due time.
Separate Concurring Opinion:
Justice J.B.L. Reyes concurred in the result but emphasized that lower courts should immediately hear and decide issues on whether a labor dispute is involved. He pointed out that Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 ordains that a labor injunction issued ex parte should be automatically vacated after five days. By deferring the resolution beyond this statutory period, the court effectively maintains an injunction beyond the maximum period authorized by law, thereby nullifying a statutory provision designed to protect labor.