G.R. No. 177414 November 14, 2008
NOEL E. MORA, petitioner, vs. AVESCO MARKETING CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Noel E. Mora was hired as a sales engineer by respondent Avesco Marketing Corporation in March 1996. On March 25, 2003, he tendered a letter of resignation effective April 25, 2003. This resignation came after he was confronted for allegedly selling competitors’ products and was given the option to resign immediately or face administrative charges. Petitioner changed his mind and withdrew his resignation on the same day, March 25, 2003, after respondent denied his request for the resignation to be effective a month later. He claimed he inadvertently left a copy of the letter at the office. The following day, March 26, 2003, respondent issued a notice of disciplinary action placing petitioner under preventive suspension pending investigation for breach of trust and directing him to explain why he should not be dismissed. In his response dated March 27, 2003, petitioner denied the accusations, stated he was willing to know the details, and claimed the notice was a step for his termination after he was offered an immediate resignation. Petitioner later learned from third parties that his employment was terminated as of April 1, 2003. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, referring it to voluntary arbitration. The Voluntary Arbitrator dismissed the complaint, finding petitioner voluntarily resigned. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling. Petitioner filed the present petition for review.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The employer failed to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. The notice of disciplinary action and preventive suspension issued after the purported resignation negate the assertion of voluntary separation. For a resignation to take effect, it must be accepted by the employer. Petitioner’s receipt of the resignation letter is not equivalent to approval. Since petitioner requested his resignation to be effective a month later (April 25, 2003) and there was no showing respondent approved it, he was deemed not to have resigned. His subsequent termination on April 1, 2003, without due process, constituted illegal dismissal. The Court set aside procedural infirmities to rule on the merits in the interest of substantial justice.